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Abstract 
 
 
The extraordinary political success achieved by the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) under the 
leadership of Jörg Haider during the 1990s is widely known as the ‘Haider Phenomenon’ in 
academic literature. This thesis is a cultural-historical investigation into the roots of Haider’s 
political breakthrough in Austrian politics during the 1990s. My aim has been to try to 
understand this political phenomenon in the context of Austrian cultural and historical 
forces and set out the political developments that enabled Haider (almost) to achieve the 
Austrian Chancellorship in 2000. 
There is already a considerable amount of scholarship available on this subject – particularly 
in German. This thesis aims to enrich this scholarship by uncovering some previously 
neglected cultural-historical aspects relating to the rise of Haider. During my research, I 
found a rich vein of sources pointing to the centrality of Kultur in any understanding of 
political-historical developments in 20th century Austria. This is certainly the case in regards 
to Haider’s FPÖ, which actually initiated a Kulturkampf as part of their populist political 
strategy in the 1990s.  
This study will also add to the body of work about the growth of right wing populism 
throughout Europe in the last twenty years. More importantly however, my thesis highlights 
the importance of focusing on local and country-specific aspects of such a political 
phenomenon in order to explain the causes of its success. Otherwise, there is a danger of 
superficial or generalized conclusions being made that distract from a deeper 
comprehension of events. 
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Introduction 
This study will contribute to current scholarship that aims to explain the rise of the Austrian 
Freedom Party (FPÖ) – under the leadership of Jörg Haider. This study will initially give the 
reader a thorough grounding in the historical and political context of the rise of Haider. The 
dissertation will then (in the form of a case-study) focus on an analysis of the cultural 
context of Haider’s FPÖ with the aim of achieving a deeper understanding of this Austrian 
political ‘phenomenon’. 
Haider led his party from relative obscurity in the 1980s to the achievement of equal 
partnership in a coalition government with the Austrian Peoples’ Party (ÖVP) in February 
2000. The formation of this coalition was the result of an unprecedented general election 
result in October 1999 in which the FPÖ managed to gain 27% of the national vote. Before 
Haider became party leader in 1986 the FPÖ was languishing at only 4% in the polls and in 
danger of not reaching the 5% threshold necessary for gaining parliamentary seats in 
Austria’s parliament. 
The election result of 1999 was interpreted by many as indicating a seismic change in the 
hitherto staid climate of post-war Austrian politics and perceived as the final deathblow to 
the consensual system of government in the Second Republic known as Proporz 
(Proporzdemokratie - democracy based on proportionality). As well causing a real break to 
the continuity of the post-war Austrian political system, the entrance of Haider's FPÖ into 
government caused significant political fall-out both in Austria and abroad, particularly 
within the European Union. The main reason for this disquiet about the inclusion of the FPÖ 
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in executive power was the perception, particularly under Haider's leadership, that the FPÖ 
was an extreme right-wing political force, rooted in the ideology of National Socialism. The 
new coalition government in Austria was seen as a dangerous source of instability in 
European politics and the potential precursor of similar right-wing political reconfigurations 
in other European states. 
There is considerable disagreement among scholars as to a definition of the political colours 
of Haider’s FPÖ. They have been variously described as extreme right-wing, neo-Nazi, far-
right, radical right, pan-German or fascist. My personal choice as a working definition for 
this study is “right-wing populism”. I will not dwell on attempting to categorize or define 
Haider’s FPÖ in this study as I do not consider such a semantic exercise relevant to my 
arguments.        
The rise of FPÖ under the leadership of Haider in the 1990s was a remarkable chapter in 
European politics. After the October 1999 general election, fevered anxiety ensued in the 
media about a Nazi ‘revival’ in Austria and there was an international outcry after the ÖVP 
decision to share power with Haider's party in a government coalition. Massive 
demonstrations took place in Vienna during the inauguration of the new government and 
the fourteen other European Union countries immediately imposed an unprecedented 
sanctions regime on a fellow member state. Suddenly, Austria and the rest of the world 
were forced to come to terms with a new type of right-wing political formation at the heart 
of European politics. 
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The structure of this study involves two distinct parts. The first part gives an historical and 
political context to the rise of Haider’s FPÖ in the 1990s. Here, I will explain how the seeds 
of right wing populism in Austria were already sown in Austrian 19th and 20th century 
history. The political context will map out Haider’s rise to power within the party and 
subsequently the whole country, including an overview of the scholarly interpretations that 
have tried to explain the Haider phenomenon. 
The second part of the thesis is a case study setting out a detailed cultural analysis of the 
rise of Haider. I chose to focus on Kultur because I consider it a neglected area in the study 
of Haider’s FPÖ and due to the valuable insights such an analysis offers about this very 
Austrian political phenomenon. ‘Very Austrian’ in this context refers to the fact that Haider’s 
FPÖ should be treated foremost as a national phenomenon rather than being categorized as 
simply part of a Europe wide lurch to the right. Secondly, Haider carefully implemented his 
political strategy in order to take into account the special role of Kultur in Austrian political 
and social fabric. 
The FPÖ actually initiated a contemporary Kulturkampf against avant-garde artists in 
Austria. The party drew up the strands in Austrian history of a protracted ‘war’ on modern 
art stemming back to the fin-de-siecle at the beginning of the 20th century. Here, modern art 
is associated with dangers such as radicalism, profanity, communism and is therefore a valid 
political target. The result has been that avant-garde art in Austria has shown itself to be 
more radical and politicized than in other countries while also being perceived as a real 
threat by the Austrian political and religious establishment. So, after giving a context to the 
FPÖ initiated Kulturkampf in the 1990s, the case study will analyze the cultural policies and 
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rhetoric of Haider’s FPÖ. This will be followed by a focus on the artistic responses to 
Haider’s Kulturkampf within Austria and then an elucidation of the so-called ‘Austrian Idea’ - 
a rhetorical construct from the 1950s that formed the theoretical basis of Haider’s entry 
into Austrian cultural politics. By offering this new perspective on Haider's FPÖ, I hope that 
my cultural ‘take’ on the Haider story will deepen our understanding of this political 
phenomenon. 
The reader needs to be acquainted with two basic assumptions before reading this thesis. 
Firstly, my starting point has been to treat the FPÖ’s rise to power as a ‘political success 
story’ in itself rather than understanding their rise to power in terms of the ‘failure’ of the 
other Austrian political parties to stop or prevent its ascent to power from 1986. The 
reasoning behind this is that far too many explanations of Haider's FPÖ have neglected the 
innovative and skillful political strategy employed by Haider to secure executive power. 
Thus, by focusing too much on the apparent failure of the other political parties in ‘allowing’ 
the FPÖ to achieve political power or blaming the ‘fossilized’ state of the Austrian political 
system in not ‘preventing’ Haider, many scholars and commentators have at best 
underestimated, or at worst falsely interpreted, some salient factors that have contributed 
to the party's success in the 1990s. 
My second assumption concerns the use of a ‘cultural’ approach in this study. The reasoning 
behind this is that a key element contributing to the success of Haider as party leader was 
his ability to steer the Austrian electorate away from the class-based political competition of 
previous decades by introducing a new type of ‘identity’ politics into the Austrian political 
arena. This led to many Austrians choosing the FPÖ not only as a protest vote but also due 
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to the genuine perception held by many voters that Haider’s FPÖ represented a vote for a 
party that had the ‘patriotic’ interests of ‘real’ Austrians at heart.  
A wide range of historical, contemporary and interdisciplinary texts will be used in the study 
from both German and English language sources. Primary material has been used that 
draws on some interviews that I undertook in Vienna during January 2002 and an analysis of 
some relevant FPÖ party documents.  
It is important to emphasize here that a central thread of argument throughout this study is 
that in order to obtain a full understanding of the rise of Haider’s FPÖ in the 1990s you must 
take Austrian cultural historical factors into account that enabled this rise and contributed 
to the party achieving such significant electoral support. By simply dismissing Haider as a 
neo-fascist or embracing him as some kind of necessary ‘modernizer’ for an outdated 
political system misses the fact that the FPÖ’s political success in the 1990s occurred in a 
specific type of Austrian political culture that arose out of the traumatic events of the 
second world war. Therefore, although on the face of it Austria did manage to achieve 
economic and political stability in the first decades of the Second Republic, a myriad of 
social and cultural problems were ignored by political elites that contributed to a very fertile 
soil being sown for the likes of Jörg Haider to nurture and expand his right-wing populist 
project.  
From 1986 onwards, the FPÖ influenced the voting behavior of Austrians by a mixture of 
emotionalized, irrational and simplistic political rhetoric depicting Haider as a kind of 
Austrian ‘savior’ and haven of ‘security’ in the troubled and uncertain world of post-
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communism and the entry of Austria into the European Union in 1995. This uncertainty was 
capitalized on by the FPÖ through a focus on issues such as uncontrolled immigration; 
crime; the corrosive influence of the ‘Left’ in Austrian society and public institutions; and the 
abuse of privileges prevalent within the Austrian political class. Haider succeeded, in a 
manner unprecedented in Europe since before the war, to rise from political obscurity and 
‘capture the imagination’ of a populace with a distinctly reactionary and anti-modernist 
populist agenda. On a practical level, Haider's political achievement was to assemble a 
political force that was capable of offering a package of seemingly contradictory policies to 
different constituencies in the Austrian electorate at the same time. The FPÖ’s Kulturkampf, 
as outlined in my case study, is a typical example of one of the political strategies pursued 
by Haider in the 1990s in his goal for executive power. 
On a final note, Jörg Haider’s FPÖ subsequently failed in office during the 2000-2002. The 
party split and their share of the vote plummeted. Haider himself died in a car accident in 
October 2008. However, the FPÖ managed to shake off their troubles and become, at the 
time of writing this introduction (summer 2012), the second largest party in Austria. The 
legacy of Haider and his contribution to the reconfiguration of Austrian politics and 
European right-wing populism that has taken place in the last decades is beyond doubt. It 
will remain an important focus for academic study for years to come.  
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Chapter 1 
 
The Historical Seeds of Austrian Right Wing Populism in 20th Century History 
 
A new type of Austrian right-wing populism emerged in 1986 in the form of Jörg Haider’s 
FPÖ (Riedlsperger, 1991). Their subsequent electoral successes and the establishment of a 
large (and seemingly entrenched) right-wing populist presence in Austrian politics was not 
only due to a structural crisis in Austrian post-war political institutions (see chapter 2) or 
some kind of new Austrian fascism emerging in the form of ‘Haiderism’ (Bailer & 
Neugebauer, 1997, p272). There were also deep historical factors embedded in Austrian 
society that produced some very favorable conditions for the emergence of right-wing 
populism in Austria by the 1980s. These historical factors (political, social and cultural) help 
to explain the scale and momentum of the Freedom Party’s electoral rise in the 1990s. They 
also help us gain an insight into the peculiar character of right-wing populism in Austria - as 
opposed to comparable European countries such as Denmark or The Netherlands. Jörg 
Haider, the political opportunist par excellence, had an acute awareness of these historical 
conditions - and managed to use them very effectively. 
This chapter will connect the rise of the FPÖ to some relevant historical factors – mostly 
from Austrian history since 1900. I will argue that Haider’s populist political message 
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(including the critique of an ‘old’ and ‘outdated’ political establishment; spreading fear 
about divisive ‘foreign’ influences; and the construction a new type of Austrian patriotism) 
had a particular resonance for many ordinary Austrians in the 1990s. He awakened some 
still unresolved historical scores in Austrian society and fueled a growing resentment 
towards mainstream politics. Haider also managed to address some fundamental issues 
which Austria had faced after 1945 that the political élites at the time refused to address for 
reasons of expediency, opportunism and Realpolitik (Pelinka in Steininger et al, 2002, 
p.323). Among the issues carefully avoided by the Austrian political establishment after 
1945 was the treatment of the Austrian Jewish population – in particular questions of the 
restitution and re-habilitation of Jewish exiles after the war (Pick, 2000, p156). Austrian 
politicians also chose to ignore (unlike their counterparts in West Germany) the extent and 
complicity of Austrians involved in Nazi war crimes right up to the 1980s (Ibid, p157). Finally, 
the many Austrians who were ex-Nazi party members in 1945 formed a reservoir of 
discontent amongst a ‘war generation’ that subsequently remained a simmering political 
issue right up to the present-day. 
Instead of addressing such politically sensitive issues, the post-war Austrian political class 
pursued a cultural, social and economic strategy with the specific aim of uniting the main 
political camps that had previously been on opposing sides of the Austrian civil war in 1934 
by the implementation of a form of governmental power-sharing subsequently known as 
Proporz (Pelinka, p96-115, 1996). The Austrian Provisional Government set up in 1945 made 
economic growth and political stability its top priority and the post-war years saw the 
establishment of a stable liberal democracy with a generous welfare state, known as the 
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Second Republic. The effect of the post-war economic boom coupled with a stable political 
situation gave rise to an increasing trust in, and support of, this new Austrian political 
establishment. This support is evidenced by how the two main Austrian political parties 
Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ) and the Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP) managed to 
achieve over 90% share of the Austrian vote in every general election right up to the advent 
of Haider in 1986 (Ibid, p98). Austria became a shining example of economic growth, 
political stability and a functioning welfare state in the heart of Europe. However, the deep 
wounds and resentments held by many in Austria after the war were left festering by a 
political class (and population) determined to ‘move on’…whatever the cost (Ibid, p.99).  
It was not until the 1980s that any proper attempt was made by these political élites to 
‘deal’ with any controversial issues – particularly those stemming from the legacy of 
National Socialism. However by that time, only a minority on the political Left or a few 
prominent cultural figures were prepared to challenge the hypocrisy of the Second Republic 
surrounding these issues (Ibid, p110). In fact, most Austrians felt either threatened or even 
intimidated by such soul-searching – wishing that such uncomfortable issues were better 
‘left alone’ (Ibid, p.113). 
When Jörg Haider entered the Austrian political arena in the 1980s, he well positioned to 
form an extremely effective opposition to the increasingly unpopular Proporz system as well 
as benefiting from the uncertainty and ‘angst’ felt by many Austrians resulting from a new 
(international) focus on Austria’s participation in the Third Reich as a result of the Waldheim 
crisis (1986) and the perceived threat to traditional values coming from the liberalizing 
forces of modernization like multiculturalism, women’s emancipation and permissiveness 
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(Markovits in Wodak & Pelinka, 2002, pp95-121). In effect, a fertile ground for the take-off 
of right-wing populism in the 1990s had already been sown by the previous generation of 
Austrian politicians by their construction of a distinctly Austrian type of cultural and political 
parochialism that made certain issues (particularly those related to the period from 1934 to 
1945 – i.e. the periods of Austro-Fascism1 in the 1930s and Austria’s integration into the 
Third Reich from 1938 to 1945) basically out of bounds for mainstream politicians. 
This chapter will now focus on two historical factors relevant to the cultivation of this fertile 
ground for the rise of Haider in the 1990s. Firstly, the subject of Austrian parochialism will 
be brought to light by charting some developments in the late 19th and early 20th century 
that set the scene for Haider’s later political success. Secondly, there will be an analysis of 
how two (very different) minority groups were affected by the Austrian political processes 
after 1945 – Austrian Jews and Austrian Pan-Germans. Both these groups were marginalized 
in Austria right up to the 1980s – a process that was an important contributory factor to the 
political dislocation that occurred in the Haider period. 
Austrian Parochialism 
Parochialism - when used in a political or cultural context is defined as a certain backward, 
localized narrow-mindedness and has been connected to social and political manifestations 
such as xenophobia, nationalism and conservatism (Bollenbeck, 2000, p68). It involves a 
suspicion of notions such as ‘progress’ or ‘modernity’ because they lead to a disruption of 
                                                            
1 A debatable terminology – it was not comparable to Italian or German fascism in terms of repression etc however it has since become 
the most widely used phrase for describing Austria in 1930s 
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tradition and cultural continuity – it can also be understood as a kind of opposite to multi-
culturalism or cosmopolitanism. Parochialism is particularly pronounced in the Austro-
German context, stemming from a deep mistrust of modernity and unfettered capitalism 
that was perceived to have brought about a collapse in traditional ‘German’ values, i.e. 
conventions and beliefs that had underpinned German culture during the 19th century 
(Johnston, 1972, p.19). Such parochialism manifested itself later in the form of a distaste or 
hatred for ‘modern art’ (Bollenbeck, 2000, p69), famously described as ‘degenerate’ by the 
Nazis. In the Austrian case, a particular strand of parochialism developed after 1945 that 
was hidden beneath the façade of a ‘progressive’ Second Republic (Ibid, p.71). By this time, 
the prevalence of parochial and anti-progressive attitudes was widespread amongst 
ordinary people and deeply embedded in the political class and amongst many Austrian 
intellectuals (Hanisch, 1994, p433). The only strand of post-war Austrian society that voiced 
resistance came from the cultural avant-garde - a very small section of society, located 
almost exclusively in and around the capital, Vienna (Ibid, p475). 
Austrian parochialism was most evident in the widespread antipathy latent in both élite 
circles and in the majority of the population towards Modern Art – a constant feature of 
Austrian political and cultural life throughout the 20th century. Even the renowned period of 
artistic creativity in Austria known as the ‘Fin-de-Siècle’ (Schorske, 1992, p8) was later 
deemed to be ‘biologically decadent’ by the Austrian artistic establishment in the 1930s 
(Segar, p.365). The 1930s saw the Austrian political establishment share with their National 
Socialist neighbors in Germany a kind of foreboding for the coming epoch of ‘decadence’:  
17 
 
“Entwicklungsgeschichte der moderne Kunst’ became the ‘Entartungsgeschichte der 
Epoche’......The crisis of the arts reflected the crisis of liberal bourgeois society (in Austria) in 
the process of destroying the bases of its existence, the systems of value, convention, and 
intellectual understanding which structured and ordered it” (Bollenbeck, 2000, p68) 
In short, an historical strand can be traced of a distinctly anti-modernist, parochial political 
culture in Austria that formed an essential background to the flourishing of right-wing 
populism in the 1990s. 
Previous to 1918, Austria was just a small part of the vast Habsburg Austro-Hungarian 
Empire which spanned a large area of central Europe. The capital’s empire was Vienna - the 
cultural and political hub of the Habsburg Empire. The first half of the 19th century saw the 
rise of a particular type of cultural movement known as Biedermeier2. This was an 
aristocratic and baroque cultural movement that attempted to perpetuate the values and 
ideas of the ruling Hapsburg élites. Biedermeier developed into Bildungsbürgertum a 
cultural hegemony already pervasive in bourgeois culture throughout Europe. The political 
culture in Austria which perpetuated this cultural conservatism was predominantly Catholic 
and anti-liberal in character (Strong, 1998, p112). 
The beginning of the 20th century coincided with a clear failure of liberal forces in Austria 
achieving any political breakthrough and challenging such conservative forces (Ibid, p.107). 
There was a stifling atmosphere of Catholic conservatism in the Austrian political 
                                                            
2A name derived from a satirical fictional figure created in 1850 by a German humorist called Ludwig Eichrodt, the character of 
Biedermeier was that of a pious village schoolmaster, law-abiding and serene (Johnston, 1972, p18). 
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establishment - a situation that brought the familiar reaction (and subsequent counter 
reaction) from progressive cultural elements in Austrian society. This turn-of-the-century 
Kulturkampf – i.e. the familiar refrain of conservative elements in Austrian society (the 
Church, Anti-Semitist populists, Pan-Germans etc.) attacking progressive forces, particularly 
Modern Art, as representing a decadent, anti-patriotic strand in society. This Kulturkampf 
was subsequently repeated in Austria during the 1960s and 1970s. 
The 1900s were an intensively creative phase of artistic production during the dying years of 
the Habsburg monarchy, known as the ‘Vienna Fin-de-Siècle’. It was a period marked by a 
proliferation of cultural activity in visual arts, music, theatre and literature. Among the many 
artists active at this time were Adolf Loos in architecture, Arnold Schönberg in music, Klimt 
and Schiele in the visual arts and Sigmund Freud in psychoanalysis, Schorske describes 
Vienna as a kind of cultural ‘hothouse’ comprising of: 
“A comprehensive rejection of all major formative forces in the Austrian tradition: the 
Catholic culture of grace, where the Word is incarnate and made manifest in flesh; the 
secular adaptation of the culture of grace by the bourgeoisie to supplement and sublimate 
its own primary culture of law; and finally, the turning to art as itself the source of value, as 
religion-substitute in liberalism’s crisis of the fin de siècle” (Schorske, 1992, p361). 
Parallel to this surge in cultural production and controversy in Vienna, Austria also 
experienced its first modern political populist movements. The main protagonists were the 
Christian-Socialist mayor of Vienna, Karl Lüger and the radical German nationalist, Georg 
von Schönerer. Although they represented different political parties, both these populist 
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politicians had important similarities that reflected the popular backlash in Austria against 
the cosmopolitanism of this new ‘modernity’ that was becoming pervasive throughout 
Europe. Similarities between these two politicians can be noted in three ways (Ibid, p145). 
Firstly, they shared a populist style of politics that sought to mobilize mass support through 
demagoguery, demonstrations and political agitation. Secondly, although Lueger was less 
outspoken in this matter than Schönerer, both politicians advocated an adherence to 
German culture rather than the multiculturalism advocated by the Kaiser. They were both 
anti-liberal and socially conservative while professing to ‘champion democracy’. Thirdly, and 
most importantly, they were openly anti-Semitic, perceiving the Jews as being a ‘problem’ 
for Austrian culture and society: 
“Schönerer and Lueger, each after a fashion, had succeeded in championing democracy 
while fighting liberalism. Both composed ideological systems that unified liberalism’s 
enemies. Each, in his own way, utilized aristocratic style, gesture, or pretension to mobilize a 
mass of followers still hungry for a leadership that based its authority on something older 
and deeper than the power of rational argument and empirical evidence”. (Ibid, p145)   
The question as to why such an explosive mix of artistic experimentation, political populism, 
nationalism and anti-Semitism occurred in Vienna at this time has been the subject of 
considerable historical discussion (Ibid, p.xviii). Without doubt, the consequences of this 
decade would influence Austrian (and European) culture and politics for years to come – 
right up to the present day. Several theories have been put forward in an attempt to explain 
the nature and causes of the Viennese ‘Fin-de-Siècle’ (Hanisch, 1994, p247). The French 
historian Braudel (Ibid, p.248) suggested that many ‘dying’ empires have displayed a similar 
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phase of intensive creativity – in the case of Austria, the Fin-de-Siècle can be seen as a 
period of ‘the last days of civilization’(Ibid, p250) before the complete disintegration of the 
Austro-Hungarian empire after the First World War. Another suggestion is that the stifling 
and anti-liberal attitudes of the ruling élite and populist politicians caused some to attempt 
an escape from this oppressive atmosphere and form an alternative radical political identity 
through works of art as a reaction and replacement of the pervading parochial culture (Ibid 
p.252). Thirdly, Vienna contained a unique sprawl of diverse cultures and nationalities - 
these multicultural influences formed a basis for experimenting in new forms of art, 
architecture, music etc. And finally, against the backdrop of entrenched anti-Semitism that 
was already embedded in Austrian life, the modernist artistic movement came to be 
perceived and labeled as something particularly ‘Jewish’. Although there were many non-
Jewish participants in the Fin de Siècle, there were proportionally more Jews as opposed to 
other ethnic or religious groups. Thus modernism and its cultural expression, modern art, 
came to be seen by many as a distinctly ‘Jewish’ project.  
“Viennese modernism was considered to be Jewish, and in the Vienna ruled by anti-Semitism 
the ‘fight against Jewry’ was in the centre of the cultural battle”. (Hamann, 2010, p79) 
The Austrian born Adolf Hitler, who was living in Vienna at this time, made a direct 
association between ‘Jewry’ and modernism, stating: 
“…in Vienna, almost everything that was wholesome was called kitsch by the filthy Jews”. 
(Hitler quoted in Hamann, 2010, p72).  
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The First World War and subsequent break-up of the Austro-Hungarian Empire put an end 
to this chaotic political and cultural phase. The battle lines between the avant-garde and the 
anti-modernist parochial culture were now firmly drawn and would remain entrenched up 
to the 1960s. In the first decades of the First Republic, after the signing of the Treaty of 
Saint-Germain in June 1919, the progressive modernists did find some favor and support 
from the newly formed SPÖ. However the catholic conservatives and pan-Germans (who 
were in the majority) were united in their distaste and rejection of this type of modern 
‘degenerate’ art. An anti-modernist coalition of the right (aided by the deteriorating social 
and political circumstances at the time) would go on and retain its hegemony over Austrian 
culture and politics until after the Second World War. 
The polarization of Austrian politics between the right and left even led to a brief civil war in 
1934 in which the Catholic conservatives were victorious. They subsequently banned the 
political activities of the SPÖ and the Austrian National Socialist Party (Segar, 1991, p57). 
The ‘Austro-fascist’ period began, lasting until the Anschlüss with Nazi Germany in 1938. The 
cultural policies of the authoritarian regime under Dollfuss were basically a watered down 
version of similar measures being implemented in neighboring Nazi Germany. 
The Dollfuss regime’s Kulturpolitik involved the propagation of a ‘hierarchical, Christian and 
Germanic’ cultural vision (Segar, 1991, p363). This included giving moral and financial 
support to artistic and cultural works that supported the religious, ethical and political 
status quo, for example, works containing a patriotic Austro-German bias were given extra 
state support (Ibid, p365). Thus, the policy of repressing modernist cultural tendencies and 
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the marginalization of Jewish influences was already well established in Austria well before 
the Anschlüss with Germany in 1938:   
“The cultural scapegoats of the ‘Austrianfascist’ period were hardly different to the NS 
period. Both fought against the ‘culturalbolshevism’ of modernism and promoted a 
‘Volkskunst’ which was directed against the elitist culture of the avant-garde” (Hanisch, 
p324)3 
This meant that the integration of Austria into the Third Reich after 1938 merely reinforced 
an already entrenched anti-modernist cultural policy in Austria. The main difference 
between Austria’s and Nazi Germany’s cultural policies was the fact that Hitler prioritized a 
specifically National Socialist Kulturpolitk in which both art and art criticism were used as 
weapons in an overall national socialist political struggle called, Gleichschaltung. Here, Nazi 
policy makers introduced a raft of parallel policies with the aim of achieving total political 
control. As part of this, Hitler instigated the policy of a ‘Kampf um die Kunst’ (Hinz, 1980, 
p45) after 1934, showing how prioritized a battle against decadent modern art (Entartete 
Kunst). In a speech at the German Exhibition of 1939 he stated the importance of a 
‘rigorous’ Kulturpolitik: 
“Those who are responsible for the shaping of people’s attitudes in the sphere of politics 
must endeavor to direct the peoples’ artistic forces - even at the expense of rigorous 
intervention” (Adam, 1992, p48) 
                                                            
3 All sources that are originally written in German have been translated by the author of this study 
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It should be noted here that Hitler’s political views had already been formed in the milieu of 
pre-war Vienna. He had entered politics as a result of a failed attempt at a career as an artist 
and ended up hating the decadent ‘cultural élite’ that had not awarded him a place in the 
Vienna Academy of Art in 1907. Hitler rejected the ‘degenerate’ modern art being produced 
in Vienna during this decade and saw the ‘cleansing’ of this type of art and the promotion of 
a ‘wholesome German art’ as an essential part of his overall political strategy (Ibid, p49). 
The final traces of modernist artistic production were finally eradicated from Austria during 
the Nazi occupation. Artists who did not conform to the new ethos either fled or were 
persecuted. Modern art was ridiculed and held up as an example of the backward 
development of the human brain4.The two main goals of Nazi cultural policy in Austria 
became evident after 1938. Firstly, policies that had already been put into practice in 
Germany were swiftly implemented against Austrian Jewish artists. Secondly, a Nazi cultural 
policy was introduced which was to have important ramifications for post-war Austria, this 
entailed an abandonment of pursuing a specific ‘Nazi’ culture in favour of promoting 
acceptable aspects of German ‘high-culture’: 
“Abandonment of a specifically national socialist culture in favor of a reinterpretation of 
German high culture, this time including specific 'racial' criteria” (Ibid, p128) 
This promotion of German ‘high-culture’ involved the Nazi regime hijacking Viennese 
classical German culture for its own specific propaganda purposes. Alarmingly, this policy 
became continued in Austria even after 1945 and was a crucial factor in the persistence of 
                                                            
4 Stated in Hitler’s Mein Kampf (London, p354, 1969) 
24 
 
cultural parochialism in the Second Republic, contributing to the conditions needed for the 
upsurge of right-wing populism during the 1990s (Hanisch, 1994, p430). 
In 1945, after the devastation of war, the humiliation of defeat and another occupation (this 
time from the victorious Allies), many people expected Austria’s problems to get even 
worse, especially with the real prospect of at least one third of the country coming under 
permanent Soviet occupation (Pelinka, 1998, p17). However, things progressed differently 
than many thought. In a nutshell, Austria rose out of the ashes of war to become an 
independent, rich and vibrant economy with a generous welfare system. It managed to rid 
itself of both the Soviet and American occupying forces and declared itself a ‘neutral’ 
country in 1955 (Ibid, p24). Post-war Austria displayed a high level of domestic political 
stability and consensus. 
However, behind this seemingly benign exterior there was another aspect of the historical 
conditions leading to the rise of the FPÖ in the 1990s – i.e. the notion of Austria having 
fallen ‘victim’ to the Nazi aggression rather than being its ‘willing accomplice’ (Pick, 2000, 
p.224). After the war, many people held the view that Austria had managed to emerge from 
the trauma of a war and occupation which had been foisted on Austria by the ‘foreign and 
evil’ forces of German Nazism (Ibid, p225). Subsequent governments of the Second Republic 
were able to reinforce this so-called ‘victim thesis’ by referring to the ‘Moscow Declaration 
on Austria’ signed by Britain, America and the Soviet Union in November 1943 which stated 
that Austria was the: ‘First free country to fall a victim to Hitlerite aggression’ (Ibid, p224). 
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However, Austrian diplomats managed to let the more controversial final paragraph of the 
declaration disappear from public view: 
Austria is reminded however, that she has a responsibility that she cannot evade for the 
participation in the war on the side of Hitlerite Germany, and that in the final settlement 
account will inevitably be taken of her own contribution to her liberation…(Ibid, p224) 
Between 1945 and 1986, the façade of Austria as an ‘isle of the blessed5’ (Hanisch, 1992, 
p475) was slowly but surely lifted to reveal a darker side of a country where Austrian post-
war politicians had deliberately avoided dealing with the issues arising out of the Austro-
Fascist and Nazi legacy for the sake of political expediency: 
“Reconciliation (concerning Austro-Fascism and Austrian Nazism) meant a conspiracy of 
silence about the past. The civil war of 1934 was consigned to an 'oubliette'. The 
commemorations on its 50th anniversary caused some surprise and 
embarrassment....Austria's part in the Third Reich was even more energetically 
repressed....the 1980s provided a rude shock in the form of the international debate about 
President Waldheim’s wartime career. These developments might indicate a suffocating 
avoidance of controversy and an attempt to stifle the types of conflicts that are inherent in a 
modern, mature society”. (Pulzer, 1988, p228). 
                                                            
5 “Isle of the Blessed” is a quote by Pope Paul VI on his visit to the country in the early 1970s, and it seemed to denote a place that had 
become a haven from the ills found in the rest of Europe (i.e. social strife and Communism). At the forefront of this idea was the notion 
that Austrians were not responsible for the Holocaust, but were Hitler’s first victim and that the period from 1938 to 1945 was a 
‘disruption’ of Austrian traditions and history and in no way an extension of them. 
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The question of whether it was the right or wrong course of action taken by the government 
of the Second Republic that led to the re-habilitation of so many ex-Nazis, the unresolved 
restitution question or the construction of the ‘victim myth’ is a matter for historical 
discussion. However what does seem to be clear is that the policy and rhetoric of successive 
post-war Austrian administrations contributed to the ‘take off’ of right-wing populism in the 
1990s. 
To finish, this chapter will analyze the fate of the Austrian Jews and the Austrian pan-
Germans in post-war Austria – the post-war policies towards both of these groups in 
Austrian society being a crucial factor in shaping the future character of Haider’s FPÖ. 
Austrian Jews 
During the war, the ‘task’ of dealing with the Jewish ‘problem’ was undertaken with 
particular enthusiasm by the Austrian authorities (Bukey, 2002, p20). There is even evidence 
that German Nazi officials were worried about the ‘over enthusiasm’ of some Austrians in 
the initial humiliation, forced exile and appropriation of Jewish property in 1938/9 (Ibid, 
p.21). The systematic persecution of the Austrian Jewish population led to the forced exile 
of 130,000 and the extermination of 65,000 Austrian Jews between 1938 and 1945. After 
the war, these crimes were mostly forgotten, ignored and eradicated from the Austrian 
collective memory - in contrast to the more painful and reflective process of coming to 
terms with Nazism that took place in West Germany (Ibid, p21). Historical evidence clearly 
indicates that Austria was fully integrated into the Third Reich and that a majority of the 
population were willing participants and supporters of the Nazi regime’s war aims - 700,000 
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Austrians were in fact members of the National Socialist Party in 1945 a higher proportion of 
the population than in Nazi Germany itself. (Ibid, p24) 
A high proportion Austrian NSDAP members held leading positions in the Nazi apparatus of 
terror and repression (Uhl, p69, 1996), including, of course, the Führer himself - as well as 
Ernst Kaltenbrunner, Adolf Eichmann and many other Austrians who were put in charge of 
the ‘final solution’. After 1945, Austria managed to avoid international condemnation about 
its involvement in Nazi war crimes by promoting the view of Austria’s ‘victim’ status. For 
many people, these leading Nazis were basically perceived as being ‘German’ rather than 
‘Austrian’. 
In the immediate aftermath of the war there was some official identification with the 
victims of Nazism and the role of the Austrian resistance in fighting fascism (exhibited in the 
anti-Fascist exhibition Niemals vergessen shown in Vienna during 1946) (Kos in Tabor, 1994, 
p950). However, Austrian political parties soon recognized that focusing on issues such as 
the Austrian participation in Nazi war crimes; the implementation of a too rigorous policy of 
de-Nazification; or highlighting the role of the Austrian resistance  were not popular topics 
for ordinary Austrians. This antipathy led to an official policy of denial concerning the 
complicity of Austrians in Nazi war crimes that lasted well into the 1980s: 
“The official view of the Nazi era was less a matter of revealing historical truth than of 
following the 'dictates of political reason” (Uhl, p70, 1996) 
As a result of Austria’s ‘victim’ status, for many years Austrian Jews were not even 
recognized as a ‘victim group’ (Ibid, p.68). They were not even considered for initial 
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restitution payments, which were only given to Austrians who had been in the anti-fascist 
resistance or those who had been part of the political resistance to the Nazi regime. Those 
persecuted on racial or other grounds were given either low priority or not taken into 
consideration at all (Niederacher, 2003, p16). Evidence of political reluctance to deal with 
restitution for Austrian Jews can be seen in the protocols of cabinet meetings of the 
provisional government of 1945 exposing the institutional dimension of anti-Semitism in 
Austria (Ibid, p18) and the sensitivity of politicians who did not want to ‘rock the boat’ by 
pushing such uncomfortable issues into a general public that had still managed to retain, 
despite the Holocaust, a high level of anti-Semitist sentiment. 
Linked to the restitution issue were the attitude and policies of the Austrian government 
towards Jewish exiles. As late as 1959, only 8,000 had returned to Austria, most of whom: 
“…were met with anything from rejection to downright hostility and anti-Semitic prejudice” 
(Ibid, p24). 
Apart from a few functionaries in the Austrian Communist Party (KPÖ), most Austrian 
politicians took the attitude that these exiles were not welcome in Austria. If anything, such 
people would be a ‘disruptive influence’ on ongoing problems such as de-Nazification, latent 
anti-Semitism or certain government policies. Statements from Austrian politicians at the 
time clearly indicate a tendency of trying to appeal to a populace that actually felt defeated 
and occupied by the Allies rather than ‘liberated’ – especially due to the Soviet presence. 
Talk of the ‘extermination’ of the Austrian Jews; or the systematic robbery of their property; 
or the forced exile of many others – all became out of bounds for Austrian politicians – and 
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remained so until the 1980s. This state of denial in the Austrian political establishment is 
illustrated by Alfons Gorbach (ÖVP) who, although he was a concentration camp survivor 
himself (as a Catholic anti-Nazi), delivered this statement about emigrants in 1949: 
“Nowhere in these events was there so much decency, so much self-denial in the fulfillment 
of duty as with the soldiers of this war. The gentlemen who emigrated can inject as much 
moral insulin as they like; those who held their own out in the field in the most testing 
conditions know better what decency is than those who sought safety abroad as soon as the 
first ripples appeared on the calm blue ocean....I also dispute the right of emigrants to have 
any say in discussions of the Nazi question”. (Ibid, p25) 
Post-war Austria seemed to be bent on institutionalizing a kind of collective amnesia in the 
population in order to achieve specific political and economic goals: 
“The premise of Austria as victim functioned by means of discrediting other victims, since 
their mere existence called into question the Austrian claim to victim status. Similarly, the re-
integration of former Nazis required not only the ignorance but also the defamation of those 
whose fates constituted evidence of the crimes committed”. (Ibid, p26) 
It should be noted here that the facts concerning the systematic extermination of the Jews 
in Europe by the Nazis had not, as yet, been properly formulated and disseminated in the 
public domain - this was the case not only in Austria but throughout the world. In fact, it was 
not until the 1960s that the scale, planning and execution of Hitler’s ‘final solution’ were 
publicly talked about. These public debates around the Holocaust only started after the 
Eichmann trial in 1961 and it was not until Hannah Arendt’s book, Eichmann in Jerusalem. A 
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Report on the Banality of Evil (1963) was published that the term ‘Holocaust’ came to be 
widely used. 
The growth in public awareness of the Holocaust, particularly in the United States, was an 
important background factor in the hard-line approach taken by the American authorities 
towards the Austrian President, Kurt Waldheim, who was banned from entering the US and 
put on a ‘watch-list’ in 1986 for his suspected links to Nazi war crimes (Feichtlbauer, 2000, 
p247). After 1986 there was a significant effort made by many in Austria, particularly 
intellectuals, academics and artists - to re-think Austria’s ‘victim’ thesis and grasp these 
thorny questions surrounding Austria’s National Socialist legacy. A series of exhibitions took 
place about the issue; educational programs for schools on the Nazi legacy were taught; and 
numerous articles were published on the subject in Austrian journals and newspapers. This 
was a belated attempt at a Vergangenheitsbewältigung (‘coming to terms with the past’) 
around the country’s hitherto hidden complicity in the crimes of the Third Reich. Finally in 
1995, the Austrian Chancellor, Franz Vranitzky, publicly apologized for the first time about 
the Austrian role in National Socialist war crimes during a state visit to Israel – though with 
some reservation (Ibid, p195). By 2002, some of the final issues concerning restitution were 
solved, ironically by the ÖVP/FPÖ coalition. 
Two problems arose as a result of this belated attempt to address Austria’s role in the 
crimes of National Socialism. Firstly, it was rather late for many Austrians to confront a 
collective memory that had been carefully constructed in the context of the ‘political 
realities’ of post-war Austria. The fixed attitudes held by many from the so-called ‘war 
generation’ were already firmly entrenched by the 1980s. Many Austrians refused to change 
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their views, especially when being criticized by some left-wing Austrian intellectuals or 
‘interfering’ Americans (Steininger et al, 2002, p323). Secondly, the fact that the US 
government reacted so strongly to the election of Waldheim and the perceived defamation 
of the war generation by certain Austrian politicians, academics, artists etc – actually led to 
a hardening of attitudes amongst many Austrians. They thought that their country was 
being picked upon and unfairly categorized as a hotbed of Nazism. Haider was therefore 
able to utilize these negative sentiments for the purposes of his own populist political 
strategy (Ibid, p324). 
Austrian Pan Germans 
The term ‘Pan-Germans’ refers to those Austrians who believe that Austria is part of a 
greater Germany - not an independent entity. In fact, right up to the Anschlüss in 1938, all 
Austrian political parties6 had their own pan-German vision of a Grossdeutschland. In other 
words, the vast majority of Austrians were, right up to 1945, ‘pan-Germans’ – albeit from 
different political persuasions. After 1945 – pan-Germanism began to be perceived as ‘anti-
patriotic’ (Ibid, p75); it was discredited and removed from the main political parties’ 
agendas. This led to another minority group in Austria that felt ‘victimized’ – although 
Austrian pan-Germans could not possibly be categorized as ‘victims’ in the same context as 
the Austrian Jews. 
Under a new found slogan of ‘Austrian patriotism’, post-war Austrian élites embarked on a 
nation-building process with the specific aim of eradicating this pan-German ideology from 
                                                            
6 with the notable exception of the Austrian Communist Party (KPÖ) (Thaler, 2001, p73) 
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all Austrian public life – the general view of Austrians towards pan-Germans became 
defined as: 
“Those people of yester-year, who adhere to the ideological monstrosity of Austria’s German 
character or consider themselves as members of the ‘great’ German Kulturnation. 
Austrianism stands for progress and democracy, whereas Germanism represents a 
discredited past”. (Ibid, p133) 
The main political parties in Austria were intent on uniting the population with a new type 
of Austrian nationalism with the primary purpose of establishing a political distance from 
Germany. Three aspects of this nation building project would affect the legacy of pan-
Germanism in Austria and directly contribute to the future character and ideology of 
Haider’s FPÖ. 
Firstly, after making some initial attempts after 1945 to carry out a systematic de-
Nazification of former members of the NSDAP, the provisional government decided to 
pursue policies of assimilation and integration of this large constituency of the Austrian 
population - numbering approximately 700,000 (Ibid, p57). In 1949 voting rights were 
granted to former members of the NSDAP and the previously more rigorous policies of 
investigation and prosecution were toned down. As a result, these former NSDAP members 
were now able to join both the main parties, where some rose quite high in the political 
hierarchy, including two cabinet posts (Ibid, p58). A pragmatic consensus emerged that it 
was better to integrate former Nazis rather than to treat them as suspected criminals. 
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Secondly, and following on from this policy of assimilation, a new political party was allowed 
to form in 1949 called the League of Independents (VdU) (Riedlsperger, 1978, p39). This 
party was set up with the specific goal of representing the constituency of former Austrian 
Nazis (Ibid, p.40). The VdU was renamed the Austrian Freedom Party (FPÖ) in 1954. From 
the outset it was a marginal force in Austrian politics, seeing its role as an opposition to the 
system of Proporz and the only Austrian political party retaining the ideology of pan-
Germanism. Support for the VdU/FPÖ ebbed away from until they were almost extinguished 
as a political force in the early 1980s – pan-Germanism was, by then, perceived as a wholly 
redundant political cause (Pelinka, 1998, p33). 
Thirdly, a new type of ‘Austrianist histiorgraphy’ emerged, though one that was not written 
by Austrian academics or intellectuals, but instead by non-academic researchers and 
publicists whose main intention was the promotion of a new, patriotic version of Austrian 
popular history: 
“This emerging Austrian national ideology centered on demarcation from Germany. Austria 
and the Austrians had never been part of Germany or the German nation. Some authors 
traced Austrian separateness back to the ‘privilegium minus’ in 1156; others chose the 
dissolution of the Holy Roman Empire in 1806. Austrians were of a different descent than 
Germans and spoke a language that was clearly demarcated from the one used in Germany. 
Austrian identity was formed by the Counterreformation and the baroque period and 
represented a Catholic antipode to protestant Germany. The Austrians felt much closer to 
their East Central European neighbours than to Germans. And finally: the Austrians had been 
incorporated into Germany against their will in 1938; they had been betrayed by the 
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international community and had resisted as much as they could; they had been a mere 
victim of National Socialist Germany”. (Thaler, 2001, p59) 
This ‘re-casting’ of Austrian history attempted to reduce and even eradicate its Germanic 
dimension. This had far-reaching consequences for the political culture that subsequently 
emerged in post-war Austria, including the ‘victim thesis’ becoming a standard 
interpretation of the Nazi period in Austria – despite the contrary evidence of widespread 
support for Hitler’s regime in Austria (Pick, 2000, p150). 
The success of this historical re-casting can be seen by the lack of electoral support for the 
only political party still advocating pan-Germanism, the FPÖ. In addition, opinion polls that 
were carried out in order to gauge the level of Austrian patriotism showed that  47.3% of 
Austrians in 1964 described Austria as a ‘nation’ - a figure that rose to 72% of those 
questioned by 1994 (Thaler, p.168). In contemporary Austria, many commentators point to 
Austria having one of the most ‘patriotic’ populations in Europe (Bruckmüller in Luther & 
Pulzer, 1998, pp83-107). 
The methods used in order to achieve this identification amongst Austrians with ‘Austria’ 
rather than a continued allegiance to Grossdeutschland entailed the use of three 
institutional instruments (Bushell, 1996, p.2). Firstly, the Austrian courts enforced laws 
against German associations, German societies and the use of term ‘German’ in Austrian 
political discourse. Secondly, in the field of education, a dissemination of ‘Austrian’ history 
was practiced (as outlined above) through revised versions of school textbooks. Finally, the 
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notion of ‘Germaness’, in particular that of Nazism, was systematically ‘delegitimized’ in 
social and political discourse and replaced by a new, ‘Austrian’ patriotism: 
“The Austrian state at this time (1945-1955) gave far greater regard to patriotism than 
either to the concept of democracy or to anti-fascism in its effort to create an Austrian 
identity”. (Ibid, p6)  
This process of ‘re-education’ successfully marginalised Pan-German ideology and resulted 
in most Austrians switching from their previous allegiance towards a Grossdeutschland to a 
new patriotic identification with the Austrian Second Republic. This new allegiance was an 
important backdrop to Austrians now identifying with a specifically Austrian culture, which 
included identification with Austrian landscapes; the music of Mozart etc; Austrian political 
neutrality in the cold war; and the Austrian economic ‘miracle’ – all these and other 
symbolic attachments instilled a new and powerful sense of Austrian patriotism. However, 
this state-driven air-brushing of history came at a cost - the repression and denial of the 
extent of the participation of Austrians in Nazi war crimes - and would come back to haunt 
future generations of Austrians (Pelinka, 1998, p173). 
This chapter reveals a clear link to some specific historical forces that contributed to shaping 
the future content and character of Haider’s FPÖ. The rise of the FPÖ in the 1990s was, in 
fact, the story of a dormant political force in Austrian post-war politics that took advantage 
of belated attempts to address crucial (and controversial) issues arising from Austria’s own 
style of fascism in the 1930s and the subsequent involvement in Nazism during 1940s. Right-
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wing extremism was never ‘eradicated’ in post war Austria….it just remained silent until the 
arrival of Haider in 1986. 
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Chapter 2 
 
A Political Context 
 
Chapter two will set out the political context of Haider’s political success in the 1990s. There 
are two parts to this chapter. Firstly it will address, by analyzing three landmark elections in 
Austria during 1986, how Haider managed to turn the fortunes of his party and lay the 
foundations for future political successes. The second part focuses on how Haider’s political 
career has been interpreted in academic literature. 
 
Part I: Three Elections 
 
In 1986, three elections took place that saw the transformation of the Austrian political 
consensus of the post-war years and laid the foundations for the remarkable political 
success of Jörg Haider’s Freedom Party in the 1990s. The first election, held in May 1986, 
saw Kurt Waldheim become President of Austria. Secondly, in October, Jörg Haider was 
voted as the new Freedom Party leader during a party conference in Innsbruck – described 
by some as ‘the Haider Putsch’ (Riedlsperger, 1999). Thirdly, in November 1986, a general 
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election was held as a direct result of the political fallout from Haider becoming the new 
leader of the FPÖ. Here, Haider managed to double the FPÖ vote and cemented his 
leadership of the party.  
1. Waldheim 
Haider’s leadership ‘coup’ at a party conference in Innsbruck was preceded by the normally 
uncontroversial election for the Austrian presidency – a post of considerable symbolic 
meaning but with little political power. Normally, several candidates stand for office and 
then two put forward or ‘approved’ of by the main political parties and voted into office 
through a national presidential election. Kurt Waldheim stood as a ‘non-partisan’ candidate 
in 1986 against the SPÖ candidate, Kurt Streyer. Waldheim held a pragmatic conservative 
outlook and had the credibility of having held the post of United Nations General Secretary 
in the 1970s. During the campaign, an article in the Austrian weekly magazine Profil stated 
that there were ‘unanswered questions’ concerning Waldheim’s war record and more 
specifically his role in Nazi war crimes that took place in the Balkans during the war (Profil, 
1986). These allegations escalated as a result of Waldheim’s initial silence on the matter and 
eventually made headlines both in Austria and abroad. 
The presidential campaign became a polarized affair (Knight, TLS, 1986). On one side there 
were those who saw Waldheim as symptomatic of the façade that covered the culpability 
and active involvement of many Austrians in Nazi war crimes. This lead to the Waldheim 
‘affair’ swiftly moving from uncovering details about Waldheim’s intelligence activities in 
Greece and Yugoslavia to a radical scrutiny of Austrian anti-Semitism - initiated from 
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The impact of Waldheim’s victory encouraged Haider’s populist political strategy in two 
ways. Firstly, Austria’s post-war reputation as a respected and neutral European state that 
had suffered in equal measure to other European countries under the brutal occupation of 
the Nazis was now undermined. Austria had now revealed a ‘darker side’ - involving the 
painful exposure of its complicity and active co-operation with Nazism. For many people in 
Austria and abroad Waldheim symbolized a passive, unrepentant compliance with Nazism 
that was now an endemic aspect of Austrian society (Pelinka, 1998, p9). 
Secondly, the Waldheim affair polarized Austrian society in a way not seen since the 1930s. 
The Austrian tabloid press and some conservative politicians contended that ‘Jews and 
Jewish organizations’ were responsible for tarnishing the country’s image (Pelinka 1998 
p.194). On the other side some official representatives recognized Austria’s co-responsibility 
for the Holocaust (Ibid, p.195). Thomas Kleistl (a future Austrian president) stated in 1994: 
All too often we have spoken only of Austria as the first state to have lost its freedom and 
independence to National Socialism – and far too seldom of the fact that many of the worst 
henchmen in the Nazi dictatorship were Austrians (Ibid, p194) 
Thus, while it cannot be stated that the events surrounding this affair caused the rise of 
Haider, there is sufficient evidence to show that the Waldheim affair was an important 
catalyst for a more polarized and less consensual climate emerging in Austrian politics. This 
was an ideal background for an oppositional party like the FPÖ to gain more political 
momentum (Luther, 1987, p377). 
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2. Haider’s Putsch    
While the fallout from the Waldheim affair continued to escalate7 - a confidence vote in the 
FPÖ leadership took place at the Innsbruck party conference in September 1986. The party 
had been minority government coalition partners with the SPÖ since 1983 and the FPÖ 
party leader, Norbert Steger, held the position of Vice Chancellor. At the time, the FPÖ were 
plummeting in the opinion polls to below 5%, with a very real danger of the party 
disappearing off the Austrian political landscape (Riedlsperger, 1999). Steger was perceived 
by many in the party as incompetent and much too ‘liberal’ (Zöchling, 1999, p115). Many of 
the more ideological section of the party wished for a return to the pan-Germanic core 
values of the ‘Third Camp’ that Steger was ‘compromising’ (Ibid, p117). This party faction 
had a youthful and energetic spokesman from Carinthia – Jörg Haider.  
Haider, then still only 36, was at first reluctant to play his hand in a direct leadership 
challenge. However it became increasingly clear that he had such strong support 
(particularly from his political power base in Carinthia) that he decided to challenge Steger 
in a leadership battle. In a tumultuous party session (FAZ, 16.09.1986), which almost 
degenerated into a violent confrontation, Haider eventually won a decisive vote to become 
party leader by a margin of almost three to two8. Haider’s election victory was fuelled by the 
fears of many in the FPÖ who perceived him as the ‘last chance’ for the party’s survival; 
others saw his victory as the precursor the breakup of the FPÖ (Höbelt, 2003, p46). 
                                                            
7 The American authorities put Waldheim on a ‘watch list’ and refused him entry to the U.S. 
8 263 to 179 delegates in favour of Haider or 58% versus 39% 
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Haider most certainly had struck lucky in 1986 – as well as his political successes he 
inherited a considerable fortune in the form of a large tract of land and property in Carinthia 
from his uncle. As a result he became one of the richest people in Austria. The estate he 
received was formerly owned by a Jewish family and purchased at a considerable discount 
after the Anchluss in 1938 (Zöchling, 1999, p119). 
Haider’s successful party leadership bid precipitated an Austrian political crisis. It had 
already become clear that the socialist Chancellor, Franz Vranitzky, disliked Haider and 
would not relish the prospect of him as a minister in the Cabinet (Ibid, p120). Thus, even 
though Haider was making overtures to the SPÖ concerning his willingness to keep the 
coalition together, Vranitzky announced on the radio within 48 hours of Haider’s victory that 
he was dissolving the coalition and calling a snap general election for 23rd November, 1986. 
3. 1986 General Election 
In 1986 Haider was still a marginal political figure, receiving none of the media exposure of 
later years – positive or negative. He saw his task in 1986 as one of galvanizing a political 
party that had been through an acrimonious leadership battle and fight a general election 
on behalf of a party that had slumped to its lowest share of the vote in its entire existence. 
This election was to be a fight for both Haider’s and FPÖ’s political survival (Höbelt, 2003, 
p.50). Haider introduced a new style of political campaigning in which he performed a 
frantic schedule of political rallies and ‘pressing flesh’ whereby he was able to project the 
image of being a ‘people’s politician’ – unlike the distant and arrogant politicians he 
criticized as ‘holed up in Vienna’ (Ibid, p51). 
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Haider identified three key issues for the November 1986 election campaign. (Luther in 
Kirchner, 1988, pp213-252). Firstly, he criticized the bureaucracy and red tape that was 
hurting the agricultural sector in particular – an appeal to the rural constituency. Secondly, 
he focused on the ‘corrupt and outdated’ system of Proporz, which had produced an 
Austrian political establishment that was alienated from ordinary people and propped up by 
an endemic system of privileges and political perks. This ‘Robin Hood’ image helped Haider 
construct himself in the eyes of voters as a kind of ‘savior’ for Austria that would ‘clean up’ 
the system, rooting out privileges and corruption. Thirdly, he promoted the theme of 
‘national pride’. Haider had been a keen observer of the Waldheim affair (Zöchling, 1999, 
p.136), paying particular attention to the ‘patriotic’ vote of many Austrians who were 
unhappy about ‘foreign’ interference. The surfacing of anti-Semitism and reactionary 
rhetoric into the public realm at this time was cleverly included into the FPÖ political 
campaign where Haider portrayed himself as the only ‘real’ and ‘decent’ Austrian politician 
(Wodak et al, 1999, pp70-105).  
The outcome of the election resulted in a grand coalition between the SPÖ and ÖVP. 
However, the Haider’s FPÖ managed to double their share of the vote to 9.7%. This was 
their best election result since the 1950s. Haider had gambled successfully by staging a party 
putsch in September, 1986 – and won. In the ensuing general election in November he 
made a radical departure into populist politics – and won again. The following table shows a 
comparison between the results of the 1983 and 1986 Austrian general elections: 
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symbolized a deep malaise in the Austrian psyche, resulting from the failure of post-war 
political élites to deal with the legacy of Nazism. Some of these authors see the rise of the 
FPÖ as a danger to Austrian democracy and categorize Haider as an extreme right-winger or 
neo-Nazi. 
The Structural View 
Luther and Sully note that there is a distinct trajectory in post-war Austrian politics in which 
the ‘old’ Proporz system of cross-party political consensus had outlived its usefulness by the 
1980s. Political ‘modernization’ was required in order to adjust to the new political and 
economic forces emerging in Europe – i.e. neo-liberalism. The political risks and economic 
sacrifices involved in instigating such reforms led to the SPÖ and ÖVP simply not moving in a 
reformist direction. It was therefore left to the newly revamped FPÖ to shake up this 
‘fossilized’ Austrian political system. In this view, Haider not only modernizes the FPÖ but 
becomes the figurehead of modernizing the post-war Austrian political and economic 
system – a process long overdue.  
Luther states that Haider’s ‘structural opposition’ lies at the very core of the Freedom 
Party's ideology rather than purported 'right-wing extremism' coming from the Left: 
“The element of continuity (or 'core') of the Freedom Party's ideology may well reside not in 
right-wing extremism but in the party's structural opposition to Austria's post-war system” 
(Luther, 2000, p23). 
Luther adds: 
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“The Freedom Party is neither a neo-fascist, neo-Nazi, nor a right-wing extremist party….no 
such values govern the operation, or political goals of the party”. (ibid p27). 
Luther claims that by over-emphasizing the 'right-wing extremist' or ‘Nazi’ aspects of 
Haider's FPÖ you lose sight of the adjustments the FPÖ had to make in order to adapt to a 
more mainstream political message and the democratizing effect such a structural 
opposition was able to have on an outdated political system. Luther notes that Haider’s FPÖ 
actually contributed to a 'normalization' of Austrian politics rather than provoking some 
kind of systemic crisis: 
“A shift from a system of party competition characterized by hyper stability and 
accommodation to one in which uncertainty and competition are the order of the day….in 
some respects (this) can be regarded as a 'normalization' of the Second Republic's party 
system”. (Luther & Pulzer, 1998, p151) 
Luther also notes that the oppositional dimension of the FPÖ in the 1990s and how the 
party was singularly unprepared for executive power in 2000: 
“The transition (from opposition to government) is likely to prove especially difficult for a 
party such as the FPÖ which for so many years and so successfully pursued a strategy of 
populist agitation”. (Luther, 2001, p28) 
Sully wrote 'The Haider Phenomenon' (1997), one of the few books in English on the 
subject. In a similar vein to Luther, she puts Haider at centre stage in Austria's ‘painful 
process of modernization’ (Ibid, p204). Haider's contribution to this process entailed playing 
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the ‘radical anti-establishment card’ in Austrian political culture. This strategy involved 
targeting an Austrian political class apparently dominated by ‘1968-vintage pseudo-left 
Viennese intellectuals’ (Ibid p37). Sully implies here that Haider represented a sort of 
cleansing of a rotten political establishment still hanging on to power. She blames the 
Austrian left for failing to reform and modernize the Second Republic before 1986 - a failure 
that opened up a political space that made Haider's political breakthrough possible. 
Sully notes that the failure of the Left is evidenced by the subsequent 'hysterical' over-
reaction and virulently 'anti' Haider stance taken by many in Austria during the 1990s. The 
left's ‘anti-Haiderism’ focused itself on the apparent 'fascism' of the FPÖ, thereby bypassing 
any self-criticism and ignoring the required process of normalization that was taking place in 
an ‘ordinary western democracy’ (Ibid, p200). 
For Sully, Haider's politics are a "potpourri" of ideas from all sides of the political spectrum 
designed to appeal to as many people as possible without completely disenchanting or 
betraying some core party principles. Her fundamental observation is the fact that Haider's 
Freedom Party, after becoming such a strong political player in the 1990s, became capable 
of breaking old political cleavages and reforming an outdated political system: 
“Haider's project to change Austria is built on a potpourri of ideas from the right and left, 
from neo-liberalism economics, conservative slogans and old socialist rhetoric. It is radical 
but also conservative”. (ibid, p201) 
The third author, Höbelt, is perceived as being 'close' to the FPÖ – a kind of ‘party’ historian. 
In his most recent book on the subject (Höbelt, 2003), he emphasizes the crucial role that 
49 
 
Haider played in the transformation of the Austrian post-war political system during the 
1990s. He describes Haider as a ‘harbinger of change against a system of power-sharing 
(Proporz) that was all-pervasive’ (Ibid, p24). The key element of Haider's political strategy to 
bring about systemic change was to provoke and mobilize a notoriously apathetic voting 
public into registering their 'disgust' with the ruling political class. Höbelt notes that Haider 
was the first Austrian politician to focus specifically on undecided voters in his election 
campaigning (ibid. p154).  
Höbelt also states that Haider’s electoral successes created some internal party tensions, 
most significantly between the party’s ‘old guard’ (who were becoming politically irrelevant) 
and the new breed of Freedomite ‘populists’ keen on obtaining the trappings of power. The 
long-standing party members were increasingly perturbed about the developments and 
events that they had ‘kick-started but no longer controlled’ (Ibid, p61). They were 
particularly unhappy after having played the role of ‘kingmaker’ for Haider in 1986 to get 
him elected as party leader and then be marginalized by unprincipled career politicians 
(Ibid, p62). 
Höbelt reflects on the issue of the "Nazi question mark" that hovers over the FPÖ, which 
entailed the assumption that the FPÖ was basically a neo-fascist party masquerading as a 
mainstream liberal political movement. He states that Haider took a political gamble (which 
in hindsight he probably lost) by being too 'outspoken' on the various taboos stemming 
from Austria's past, in particular the Nazi legacy. Haider's intention here was to gain popular 
domestic support by appearing to 'speak out' on important issues that other Austrian 
politicians were keeping silent on. However his rhetoric and occasional 'gaffes' about 
50 
 
Nazism led to the unshakeable image (particularly abroad) of a neo-Nazi being in the heart 
of Austrian politics, endangering the democratic credentials of the EU. It subsequently 
became clear (especially after the election of 1999) that because of his dubious record of 
historical revisionism, Haider would never be allowed to take on a government office. 
Höbelt notes the difficulty Haider encountered in changing course on this matter (by 
apologizing or showing contrition) - he seemed to have reached a point of no return: 
“Once he had started in that direction, (with ambivalent remarks about Nazism) however, it 
was difficult for him to turn back”. (Ibid, p155). 
The Left View 
Scholars on the Left of the political spectrum also perceive Haider as an important catalyst 
for political change in Austria. However, it is a change for the worse – a reactionary step 
backwards. They emphasize issues such as the 'threat' posed to democracy by Haider; his 
links to the extreme right; his historical revisionism; and his xenophobia.  
Neugebauer holds Haider responsible for shifting the FPÖ from the liberal agenda it was 
pursuing under the leadership of Norbert Steger in the 1980s towards the ‘racist and 
extreme right-wing agenda’ that marks out the Haider era (Neugebauer/Bailer, 1997). He 
contends that although the FPÖ is historically associated with the post-war policies of re-
habilitating former Austrian Nazis – it was (by the 1980s) in the process of 'normalizing' 
itself into a mainstream and moderate European Liberal political party. Neugebauer 
contends that Haider is responsible for reversing this process and states that many of the 
contemporary components of extreme right-wing tendencies in the FPÖ can be directly 
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attributed to "Haider's movement" (Ibid, p172) 
In this context, Haider's self-promotion as a ‘statesman’ and ‘Austrian patriot’ are a 
‘camouflage’ in order to fool the public about the true nature of Haider's intentions: 
“(The Austrian public was deceived by) the consistently pan-Germanistic, and in the last 
instance, anti-Austrian, basic stance of the FPÖ....to mobilize or utilize xenophobic attitudes 
in the population” (Ibid. p169). 
Neugebauer shows that some extreme right-wing groups on the margins of Austrian politics 
have been integrated into the FPÖ since Haider became party leader (Ibid, p.166). Thus, 
while Haider was busy raising the ‘moderate’ profile of the FPÖ with various populist 
proposals, there was a parallel process going on of an increasingly active, vocal and 
expanding faction of neo-Nazi elements within the party (Neugebauer et al, 1996, p50). 
Neugebauer sees the main reason for FPÖ’s success as stemming from the failure and 
breakdown of democratic Austrian political culture. Haider’s strategy is simple - to change 
the nature of the state and political system according to his own wishes (Ibid, p55) 
Ruth Wodak carried out a ‘discursive analysis’ of Haider and the FPÖ during the 1990s 
(Wodak et al. 1999). The aim of this type of analysis was to uncover hidden codes and 
modes of expression that reveal the ‘real’ nature of Haider's FPÖ. Wodak states that Haider 
had managed to manipulate language in order to construct a ‘new’ type of Austrian national 
identity. For Wodak, this ‘constructed identity’ had the effect of polarizing the population 
with the aim of creating the sort of divisive society in which reactionary politics could thrive. 
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Wodak contends that Haider's Austria is a divided society composed of the ‘good guys’ 
(white, Germanic Austrians) and the ‘bad guys’ (notably black people, Jews, intellectuals and 
East Europeans) (Ibid, p40). 
Similar to Neugebauer she notes that Haider utilizes xenophobic prejudices already held by 
many Austrians and succeeded in using them to his own political advantage - at the expense 
of ‘progressive’ political forces in Austria. Haider even went as far as making a new 
assessment of Austria's "past, present and future" by postulating in his rhetoric who he 
considers to be the "echt, anständig und ordentlich" (sincere, decent and orderly) citizens of 
Austria (Wodak, 2000 pp10-11). 
Anton Pelinka is probably the most prolific and widely quoted academic on Haider's FPÖ. 
Pelinka accepts that Haider brought about a ‘modernization’ process in Austrian politics. 
However the significance of this is due to the ‘Haider effect’ which involved many previously 
left-wing voters from lower social classes switching their allegiance towards the populist 
right: 
“The thoughts and actions of the 'underdogs' (i.e. lower classes) are increasingly right-wing” 
(Pelinka 1998, p117). 
Pelinka states that this shift to the right in voting behavior did not suddenly begin with 
Haider’s arrival into Austrian politics but arose out of the ‘taboos and self-deception’ that 
were endemic to the ‘Second Republic's re-construction of history’ (Pelinka, 2002, pp1-15). 
This type of self-deception produced the 'victim thesis' (see chapter 1), a convenient myth 
that propagated that the Austrians were 'the good Germans' as opposed to the Nazis. 
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Pelinka locates the rise of Haider in a series of post-war crises in Austrian society. Firstly, in 
the protests of the 1960s. Here, Austria was no exception where, as in most of Western 
Europe, there was a challenge to the post-war values of continuity and denial.9 Secondly, 
the 1980s brought a decline in the stability and consensus of the political system, making 
the ‘proporz’ arrangement a less viable political model. Thirdly, in the 1990s there was the 
impact and imposition on Austria of a new type of European and international agenda. This 
‘foreign’ agenda became a focal point of critique for Haider. 
“All these crises together changed Austrian society; and when the society and economy 
changed, the political system had to change also” (Pelinka, 1998, p213). 
By implication, Pelinka points towards historical forces that were already favorable to a 
right-wing populist such as Haider to enter the political arena. He also argues that while 
Haider’s alleged association with Nazism was not necessarily a ‘vote winner’ it was 
indicative of Austria’s political culture that it did not seem to prevent 27% of Austrians 
voting for him in 1999 (Pelinka, 2002, pp1 -15). 
This chapter has given a political context to Haider. On a final note it is important to 
emphasize the systemic and ideological reasons for the FPÖ’s electoral successes in the 
1990s. There are additional writers who have focused on Haider’s personality and political 
marketing skills, for example his notorious and ‘telegenic’ media appearances. These 
aspects of the Haider ‘phenomenon’ were highlighted in Walter Ötsch’s book, ‘Haider Light’ 
                                                            
9 Where Austria did differ from the rest of Western Europe (I would argue) is that the 1960s ‘protests’ occurred almost exclusively in the 
cultural arena rather than through demonstrations and strikes (see the case study). 
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(Ötsch, 2000) as well as numerous sources in postmodernist sociological literature. While I 
think this area of study is a valid investigation into the role of Haider’s charisma as a crucial 
factor for the FPÖ’s political gains, I would argue that the subsequent success (after Haider’s 
resignation from the FPÖ in 2003 and subsequent death in 2008) of the FPÖ without Haider 
at the helm is evidence that he really did seem to exploit favorable systemic and historical 
factors to shift Austria firmly to the right….and it remains there to this day.10 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
10 Writing in summer 2012… 
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Chapter 3 
 
Haider’s Manifesto 
 
This chapter will analyze the content of the FPÖ political program and strategy in the 1990s. 
It will focus on the most important issues that Haider incorporated into his populist 
manifesto for the FPÖ. It will serve as a useful background to the case study in the next 
chapter, which examines how Haider used issues around culture and identity in order to 
maximize his populist strategy as well as appeasing the internal disquiet within his party.  
The Party Machine 
Haider managed to transform a near extinct Austrian political entity into a formidable and 
modern party machine by the early 1990s. Prior to Haider’s victorious power struggle for the 
party leadership in 1986 it was inconceivable to imagine that such a marginal political party 
such as the FPÖ would go on to become Austria’s second largest party within thirteen years. 
In the early years of his leadership, one of Haider’s most important tasks was to transform 
the party into a modern, effective and well-oiled party machine that was suited to the new 
political climate of the 1990s. Haider had the advantage over other political parties in 
Austria of dealing with a relatively compliant and willing constituency of party members 
who were hungry for political power and in awe of Haider's charismatic leadership (Ötsch, 
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2000, p.27). By contrast, the SPÖ and ÖVP suffered from the usual ailments of internal 
feuding and reluctance to take the politically risky strategy of party reform. A speech by 
Haider in 1989 indicates his resolve to ‘get things done’: 
“What counts in a party are fundamental convictions. Something which has been lacking in 
recent years. Just like the old expression: ‘While the cat’s away the mice will play’....well, 
since 1986 the cat is back again!” (Ibid, p28) 
Haider initiated a radical re-organisation of the party. He dispensed with internal opposition 
and established a strong personal power base. For many in the party, Haider became a kind 
of ‘guru’ or ‘Führer’ and attracted sycophantic behavior from his political cabinet and 
reverential treatment by party members or supporters. This was no bland politician like 
previous FPÖ leaders - his colorful, energetic and unconventional style attracted 
considerable support in his first years of leadership (Zöchling, 1999). 
The re-organisation of the party involved a total revamp of the fragmented regional parties, 
whose outdated structures were basically dissolved and built up afresh. In order to achieve 
this Haider replaced top personnel in these regional parties with his own set of hand-picked 
and loyal ‘Haiderites’ (Ötsch, 2000 p30). His position was strengthened even further when 
the FPÖ became the largest party in Carinthia after regional elections in 1989, after which 
he became the regional governor there. Haider was now in a position to not only claim a 
tight grip on his party but he was also wielding real political power as governor of Carinthia. 
This regional stronghold became an important source of political legitimacy on which Haider 
was able draw throughout his political career (Zöchling, 1997, p45). 
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After the initial euphoria surrounding Haider's leadership, the first murmurings of 
discontent began to emerge from the liberal wing of the party that was still reeling from the 
trouncing they received in Haider's leadership coup in 1986. The most potent threat to 
Haider came from his party deputy, Heide Schmidt, an able politician who was increasingly 
disconcerted with the right-wing populist agenda and xenophobic leanings of the party 
(Neugebauer, 1997). Things came to a crunch in 1993 – when the FPÖ initiated a 
referendum on tightening the immigration laws which they called ‘Austria First’. Schmidt 
interpreted this as an open declaration of xenophobic policy and resigned from the party in 
protest, taking a small contingent of fellow liberals with her. 
Schmidt went on to form a separate party called the Liberal Forum (LIF) (Ibid, p67). 
However, to the surprise of many, Haider was able to brush off this challenge and actually 
managed to increase the FPÖ share of the national vote in the subsequent election of 1994. 
In fact, Haider surpassed the 20% mark in that 1994 election. Haider's authority within the 
FPÖ was now unassailable. He was able to draw on overwhelming support from his party 
members; the strong and vocal loyalty of his own political inner circle; and an increasing 
popularity in the country as a whole (Sully, 1997, p65). 
A pertinent illustration of Haider's enduring popularity and dominance within the FPÖ is 
provided by an official party brochure produced at the end of 2001 (Freiheitliche Akademie, 
2001). Haider had already stepped down as party leader in favour of Susanne Reiss-Passer 
almost two years before the brochure's publication. However the content of this party 
document reveals, in chronological order with plush photographs and gushing clichés, the 
so-called ‘Haider years’ from 1986 to 2001. There is only one picture of the new party 
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leader, Reiss-Passer, in the whole brochure. The overwhelming impression left by reading 
this is that without Haider at the helm the FPÖ would never have made its political 
breakthrough and that the party is completely dependent upon him for continued electoral 
support. 
The Freedom Party’s Campaign Issues 
As well as tightening the party organisation and purging the FPÖ of its internal opponents, 
Haider chose a careful mix of campaigning issues, selected mostly on the basis of their 
populist appeal. Haider had to be wary throughout his leadership, especially in the later 
years, not to stray too much from the traditional far-right ideology of core members and 
supporters of the FPÖ. Haider's FPÖ also reflected a general trend in the rest of Europe that 
saw a distinct move towards political mobilization around right-wing populist issues. 
Countries such as France (Front-National), Belgium (Vlaams-Blok) or Italy (Forza Italia) had 
particularly strong right-wing populist movements. From the wider European perspective 
various issues emerge that all these populist parties have incorporated into their political 
strategies, such as increasing voter apathy; the disillusionment of ordinary people with the 
European Union and their own national politicians; the failure of mainstream parties to deal 
with issues such as crime or immigration; and the uncertainty created by the march of 
economic neo-liberalism (Eismann, 2002). All these issues are relevant to the progress of the 
FPÖ in the 1990s; however there are also some important Austria-specific topics – 
particularly culture and identity – which I will set out in more detail in the case study. 
Meny & Surel (2002, p69) make three points concerning the political issues adopted by 
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Haider in the 1990s. Firstly, although the party was part of a European-wide shift to the 
right, the FPÖ was different in that it was an already established and existing political entity. 
In fact, the party had been specifically established in post-war Austria to cater for the huge 
constituency of ex-Nazis (Pelinka, 1998). When Haider took over the party in 1986 he 
inherited a functioning party machine that would qualify for a significant rise in state 
funding if it improved its electoral appeal. Most of the other European right-wing populist 
parties were started in the last two decades and have shown inherent tendencies to 
implode or split due to internal conflicts and lack of experienced political players. 
Secondly, the political project embarked upon by Haider during the rise of the FPÖ in the 
1990s was essentially an oppositional strategy, with issues being selected often purely on 
the basis of placating a certain constituency without any real prospect of introducing actual 
legislation. This factor is borne out by the failure of the FPÖ to retain popularity once in 
power after 2000. Topics such as immigration or political corruption are highly complex 
issues for governments to legislate on, but easy for an opposition to campaign about 
(Meny&Surel, 2002). 
Thirdly, Haider's political strategy drew on a rich tradition of anti-modernism, political 
conservatism and ambivalent national identity that were already prevalent in Austria. 
Against this background Haider campaigned around a series of Austria-specific issues that 
were all related to four basic concepts of far-right political ideology, namely: Order; 
Tradition, Identity and Security (Ibid, p72) 
There follows a summary and analysis of the main issues adopted by Haider's FPÖ during 
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the 1990s to increase the party's electoral appeal and achieve executive power. 
The Political Class 
A survey undertaken concerning the motives of FPÖ voters taken at exit polls between 1990 
and 1999 (Ibid, p97) revealed that Haider’s critique of the political class (Proporz) was the 
main reason people gave for voting Haider. On average, 69% of voters thought that of all 
the Austrian political parties, only the FPÖ ‘seriously combats scandals and privileges’. In 
addition, 63% thought the Freedom Party had brought a ‘wind of change’ to Austria. Almost 
anything written about Haider's FPÖ, whatever political spectrum, shows that Haider's most 
consistent, and seemingly effective, electoral issue was his critique of the apparent 
corruption, abuse of privileges and repeated scandals emanating from Austria's political 
establishment. He repeatedly drove the message home to Austrians that the FPÖ was set 
apart from the ‘old parties’ and of his determination to fight the old system of corruption 
and privilege, i.e. Proporz. Haider claimed that the Austrian political establishment had ‘lost 
touch’ with the needs of ‘ordinary people’: 
“The domination of the old parties was justified when Austria was not free...today these 
parties use Austria to satiate their own greed and ambition. There is no Western democracy 
in which parties have such power and such a grip on so many spheres of private life as in 
Austria” (Haider, 1995, p46). 
Ironically, one of Haider’s most effective populist claims of being the ‘Robin Hood’ of 
Austrian politics came from one of the richest people in Austria. At one stage, he even 
insisted on FPÖ functionaries taking a salary cut, thereby boosting the ‘incorruptible’ image 
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of the party. When the FPÖ attained executive power in 2000, Haider resigned his 
leadership and later announced that he had withdrawn from any formal links with national 
politics. This could well indicate the sense of inevitability and hard reality that the coalition 
of February 2000 with the ÖVP actually meant the absorption of the Freedom Party into the 
Austrian political class. The FPÖ election campaign of 2002 was notably absent of the usual 
stinging critique directed towards the 'corrupt' shenanigans of the ÖVP and SPÖ. Haider's 
style of oppositional politics and constant lambasting of the political establishment will 
certainly need modification by a political party that was now 'part' of the establishment 
(Deicke, ECPR Conference Paper, 2004). 
Immigration 
Like most other right-wing populist parties in Europe, the FPÖ took an aggressive and 
xenophobic stance on immigration. In fact, the party's xenophobic rhetoric caused the 
European Union to take the unprecedented step of imposing sanctions on a fellow member 
state after the FPÖ came to power in February 2000. This was followed by the ‘Three Wise 
Men’11 being dispatched to Vienna to assess the European Union's position with a remit to 
check the extent of: 
“The Austrian Government’s commitment to the common European values, in particular 
concerning the rights of minorities, refugees and immigrants” (EU Report on Austria, 2000) 
Immigration had already become a hot political issue in Austria after the collapse of 
                                                            
11 Martti Ahtisaari, Jochen Frowein and Marcelino Oreja – were all high-ranking former ministers of EU states. 
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communism in 1990 which resulted in a large influx of refugees from the Balkan states due 
to the Yugoslavian conflict. It was an easy topic to campaign about because of the general 
perception amongst most ordinary Austrians that there were 'too many' immigrants and 
that they were contributing to a rise in crime, drug trafficking and unemployment. The FPÖ 
favoured the introduction of draconian measures to curb the influx immigration and 
promoted a more rigid policy of making immigrants and asylum seekers learn the German 
language and Austrian culture. An ideological message, implicit in most of Haider's rhetoric 
on this subject, was an intention to reverse the trend of ‘multiculturalism’ in Austrian 
society, a theme that will be explored more thoroughly in this study in the section on 
‘identity politics’. 
Underlying Haider’s rhetoric on immigration or the Ausländer Problem (the 'foreigner 
problem') (Meny & Surel, 2002) are two factors. Firstly, he portrayed immigration as being 
bad for the economy by connecting it with criminality, job losses and an unnecessary drain 
on the welfare state. Secondly, Haider spread fear amongst Austrians of an ‘Umvolkung’ 
(literally - 'impairment of ethnic stock') and proposed a ‘Recht auf Heimat’ (the right to an 
Austrian homeland) for Austrian born citizens (Ibid, p77). Therefore, by making immigration 
out to be a ‘threat’ to Austria, Haider made it clear that a multicultural, ethnically diverse 
society is both undesirable and a recipe for social collapse. An example of how the FPÖ 
played the immigration issue was during the 1999 election, in which the FPÖ polled its 
highest ever; result, where their main slogan was:  Stop Die Überfremdung  (Stop The Flood 
Of Immigration) 
By highlighting the issue of immigration Haider was perceived by voters as ‘grasping a 
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political nettle’ that the other parties seemed incapable of doing and of tackling an issue in 
accordance with the wishes of the people (Ibid, p.78). As a result, the governing coalition 
found itself in a no-win situation - if they spoke out on immigration, it was seen by many as 
only resulting from political pressure by Haider. If they challenged the FPÖ‘s xenophobic 
stance, the main parties could be accused of being too 'soft' on the issue. The result was 
that the SPÖ and ÖVP ended up adopting many of Haider's proposals into their own political 
manifestos - albeit somewhat toned down. By the beginning of the 21st century Austria had 
some of the most draconian immigration policies in Europe – before the FPÖ even came to 
power (Ibid, p89) 
Europe 
Before Haider, the FPÖ was a pro-Europe party. Haider chose to change this stance, 
especially after the Maastricht Treaty of 1991 which he labeled as being 'anti-patriotic': 
“Those who put the Maastricht Treaty and European unity above our Austrian cultural 
identity, should not be surprised if the seriousness of their patriotism is doubted”. (Haider, 
1995, p63) 
Haider converted his party to the politics of Euroscepticism for three reasons (Profil, 
5/8/2002). Firstly, he wished to gain political capital out of the widespread fears in Austria 
that European enlargement would lead to a wave of ‘cheap labour’ entering the country 
from Austria‘s neighbouring states in Eastern Europe. Secondly, the EU was perceived as 
being democratically unaccountable, too bureaucratic and as wielding a disproportionate 
amount of political and economic power compared to individual sovereign nations. Thirdly, 
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Haider disliked the European political ‘establishment’ in a similar manner to his domestic 
critique of Proporz. He accused ‘Brussels’ and also some national governments like Germany 
and France of being ‘out of touch’ with the general public. In a similar vein to his critique of 
Austria’s political establishment, Haider claimed that the EU is full of politicians and 
bureaucrats enjoying lavish perks and privileges at the expense of ordinary taxpayers. 
 Although Haider never advocated complete withdrawal from the EU, he wished to reverse 
the trend towards a united Europe by being in favour of bolstering national institutions - a 
policy pretty similar to that of the British Conservative Party. Thus, similar to the general 
tone of rhetoric used by the FPÖ in the 1990s, on the issue of Europe they highlighted the 
negative aspects of the EU and stoked the already existing fears amongst the general public. 
Church and Nation 
As part of his populist strategy, Haider found it necessary to scrutinize and review some 
long-standing party policies that were deemed to be outdated or off-putting to the wider 
electorate. The two main bones of contention were the party position in respect to the 
Roman Catholic Church and that of the Austrian nation (Mair et al, 2004). This revision of 
previous policies can be compared to the 'New Labour' ideological project in Britain under 
Tony Blair12 that rid itself of unwanted and unpopular left-wing principles that had been 
enshrined in the traditional Labour party constitution. 
The FPÖs relationship to the Church (in the case of Austria, predominantly the Catholic 
                                                            
12 Haider named Blair on several occasions as his ‘political example’ (FT, 2/2/2000) 
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Church) has traditionally been antagonistic. One of the features of coming from the 'third 
camp' was to have a party principle of 'anti-clericalism', not unlike the deeply held suspicion 
of the church contained in National Socialist ideology. (Pelinka, 1998, p9). This party 
principle did not manifest itself into any concrete policies such as refusing Catholics entry to 
the party, it entailed an antipathy to catholicalism and the clergy as well as opposition to the 
traditionally catholic political party, the ÖVP (Hofer, 1998). 
Haider, supported by a leading catholic functionary within the party, Erwin Stadtler, decided 
to adopt a more conciliatory stance. His reasoning for this was straightforward; in order to 
increase the party’s share of the vote it was necessary to cast a wider net amongst the 
general population. In addition, any future political alliance with the ÖVP would have to be 
forged on the basis of the FPÖ striking a more accommodating stance towards the Catholic 
Church. Various overtures were made to the Church, including the establishment of friendly 
relations between the FPÖ and the conservative bishop of St Pölten, Kurt Krenn (Ibid, p56 
and case study). Haider went so far as to have an audience with the Pope in December 2000 
(Profil, 15/12/2000) 
This ideological shift in relation to the Church bolstered the FPÖ in its political posturing on 
public morality and 'family values'. Haider and others expressed deeply conservative views 
on these matters which were well received by the Catholic Church13. The various issues in 
which the Catholic Church and Haider's FPÖ adopted similar positions included the wish for 
a return to the role of women staying 'at home' with the children; draconian solutions for 
                                                            
13 Ironically, most Austrian commentators I spoke to claim that Haider was gay (see appendix). 
66 
 
the drug problem; supporting the idea of people taking more 'public responsibility'; and a 
critique of the contents of certain aspects of modern culture such as pornography, avant-
garde experimental art etc. (Hofer, 1998).  
The second policy shift by Haider concerned the vexed issue of German nationalism (pan –
Germanism) (Höbelt, p.65, 2001 and the case study in this dissertation). Like anti-clericalism, 
this was another ideology associated with the third camp and involved the pursuit of the 
eventual goal of uniting Austria with Germany in order to set up a ‘German Nation’. The 
desire for the Anchlüss (unification with Germany) had actually been a political goal shared 
across the Austrian political spectrum, particularly just after the First World War, when 
many people felt that the rump of Austria leftover after the breakup of the Austro-
Hungarian Empire was not going to be a viable prospect as a functioning modern state 
(Segar, 1991). However after the trauma of Nazism and the newly reconfigured post-war 
world of cold war politics, any notion of an Anschlüss was completely discredited by the 
main political parties - apart from the FPÖ. 
Haider had always been rooted in the tradition of pan-Germanism, tracing back from his 
family upbringing to his early political career (Zöchling, 1999). In fact, the core supporters 
who helped him in the leadership battle of 1986 stemmed mostly from the pan-German 
faction of the party. Again, however, political expediency came before political principle for 
Haider. Pan-Germanism was perceived as an unpopular, even unpatriotic position to take in 
the Second Republic (Thaler, 2001). Haider realized that the party position needed to be 
modified, although he repeatedly expressed disdain for the concept of an Austrian nation - 
describing in as late as 1988 the process of Austria becoming a sovereign nation as a having 
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been an 'ideological miscarriage' (Pelinka et al, 2008, p129), implying that he thought the 
whole basis and legitimacy of an Austrian nation as being flawed. Despite these views and 
regular attempts to placate the pan-German core within his party, Haider steered a course 
of ridding the party ‘from harping on about German nationalism’ (Zöchling, 1999). The party 
position on this subject was subsequently modified into a wish to encourage German Kultur 
rather than any political union. Haider extrapolated this further by advocating that the FPÖ 
was the only truly patriotic Austrian party, a significant semantic turnaround (Ibid, p94). By 
1999 he had dealt with the issues of anti-clericalism and German nationalism and enabled a 
smooth transition for the FPÖ to enter a coalition with the ÖVP in February 2000. 
The War Generation 
The ‘war generation’ refers to the generation of Austrians that fought with the German 
Wehrmacht during the Second World War. Many of these former soldiers felt that their 
bravery and sacrifice was being forgotten due to the defeat of Nazism and the German 
Army's complicity with Nazi war crimes. Although this issue is not related to specific political 
policies, it has considerable symbolic value and reflects the FPÖ's connection and 
association with National Socialism and pan-Germanism (Pelinka, 1998). The war generation 
is also a theme that is not necessarily connected to the rhetoric of populism (most of the 
'war generation' are dead) but is connected to two other factors. Firstly, Haider’s National 
Socialist family background and his continued need for pleasing the right-wing of his party 
and secondly, the war generation issue fitted well into his role as the 'taboo breaker' in 
Austrian political discourse (Zöchling, 1999). 
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Haider's parents were members of the Austrian Nazi Party before the Anchluss in 1938. He 
was brought up, and instilled with, a deep respect for the 'war generation' that had fought 
so tenaciously in the Second World War. Coming from this background, Haider wanted to 
'honour' the war generation for their sacrifice and bravery rather than defaming or 
incriminating them. While recognizing that Nazi atrocities did indeed take place, Haider was 
not interested in ‘bringing up the past’, with a preference in this context to ‘look to the 
future’ (Scharsach, 2000, p34). An illustration of this was Haider’s vocal opposition to the 
Wehrmacht Austellung an exhibition that highlighted the German army’s role in Nazi war 
crimes held in Vienna during 2002 (Profil, 8/3/2002). Haider’s inherited ambivalence 
towards Austria's National Socialist legacy would manifest itself on regular occasions with 
controversial 'gaffes' about praising Nazi employment policies or the 'decency' of the men 
who belonged to the Nazi SS (Bailer & Neugebauer, 1997). 
Haider’s ‘speaking out’ on this controversial subject, whether intentionally or not, pandered 
to the FPÖ‘s core pan-German constituency and extreme right-wing elements in the party. 
Whether the 'war generation' and revisionist rhetoric about Nazism were of popular appeal 
to the Austrian electorate is debatable, on balance I think that the idea that Austrians are 
more 'Nazi' than other European countries, alleged by some authors, extremely suspect 
(Wodak & Pelinka, 2002). What does seem to have benefited Haider by raising these issues 
is a respect for a politician that is willing to 'break taboos' and 'speak his mind' on matters of 
principle. Most other Austrian politicians were seen as too wily and careful to make any 
meaningful statements. This outspoken rhetoric did carry considerable political risks for 
Haider however. As Höbelt suggests (2003), Haider might have earned a measure of respect 
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amongst the general population in Austria for taking such a risk, however on a 
governmental and international level it was to prove a disaster. Haider’s record of Nazi-
sympathetic outbursts, such as appearing before former SS veterans and describing them as 
‘dignified’ and ‘honourable’ or praising ‘some’ of Hitler’s policies (Zöchling, 1999, p103) 
made him into a person non-grata for executive power and came back to haunt him with a 
vengeance when the new coalition was established in February 2000. 
The Economy 
The FPÖ is not associated with being able to manage the economy any better than the SPÖ 
or ÖVP. However, Haider did manage to make some political mileage out of economic 
issues, albeit mostly in Carinthia rather than in national politics. On economic policy, the 
FPÖ was pretty similar to other European right-wing populist parties – offering voters a 
package of neo-liberal reforms such as lower taxes for the middle classes; a reduced budget 
deficit; and a program of accelerated privatization. Unabashed neo-liberalism however was 
recognized as unpopular with ordinary people and unfavourably compared to the 
'unfettered' capitalism in the United States. Therefore, Haider also struck a protectionist 
note, speaking out on behalf of 'saving Austrian jobs and livelihoods' against the march of 
large corporations and economic immigrants (Scharsach, 2000). Once the FPÖ was in power 
Karl Heinz Grasser, took over as Finance Minister with the aim of cutting the budget deficit 
to 'zero'. There was a significant amount of tension between the 'yuppie' Grasser and 
Haider's protectionist instincts leading to Grasser eventually resigning from the party in 
order to remain in his ministerial post until 2002. 
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The biggest impact that Haider made in economic matters was in his role as governor of 
Carinthia. He introduced short-term, sometimes eccentric, populist measures to bolster 
local support. One example of this was when Haider 'pulled off' a deal with Colonel Gaddafi 
in Libya for a supply of cheap petrol to Carinthia in 2000 (Profil, 30/3/2000). For a short 
period of time when petrol prices were rising, Austrians could obtain cheaper petrol in 
Carinthia than anywhere else in the country! Other economic measures that Haider 
proposed included a large increase in state funding for women with children known as ‘K-
SCHECKS‘ (Children’s cheques) and the reduction of wasteful state subsidies for unwanted 
artistic or governmental projects. 
Kultur 
This chapter has summarized the political issues that Haider exploited for his populist 
political project. What is shown here are the compromises that Haider was willing to make 
in order for the FPÖ to achieve more political power. A quite paradoxical picture emerges 
where, for example, a formerly pro-Europe party becomes a Eurosceptic one or a previously 
anti-clerical party warms towards the Catholic Church. Haider’s leadership shows a distinct 
willingness to push the political from the right and left as long as he could achieve more 
votes. So what remains? How can we categorize such a slippery political operator? 
Explanations that Haider simply represents a neo-nazi party are insufficient; however there 
is also clear evidence that Haider’s FPÖ was not just a harmless oppositional force that was 
breaking old political cleavages. This dilemma led me to investigate the role of Kultur in the 
FPÖ’s political strategy under Haider in order to make more sense of the Haider 
‘phenomenon’. 
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By focusing on Kultur, the divergent strands of the FPÖ are all present and a more distinctly 
Austrian right-wing political ideology emerges, steeped in peculiarly Austrian historical 
forces and intent on becoming a mainstream political party. By the inclusion of a cultural 
perspective of Haider, this dissertation enables the reader to understand the FPÖ better 
while also revealing a distinctly Austrian political phenomenon. 
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Chapter 4 – A Case Study: The Austrian Freedom Party’s 
Kulturkampf in the 1990s14  
 
Part 1. The Cultural Targets 
 
Chapters 1-3 of this study gave an historical and political context to the rise of Haider’s FPÖ. 
This case study shows how Haider drew on the peculiarities of Austrian cultural history and 
combined this with his own political opportunism in order to instigate a new type of modern 
Kulturkampf15. I have structured the case study in four distinct parts. Part 1 analyses who 
and why certain artists and cultural figures became targets of the FPÖ Kulturkampf in the 
1990s. Part 2 sets out how the party defines its own idea of Kultur and the underlying 
ideology behind this. Part 3 will analyse the response to this cultural battle by those 
targeted by Haider – the so called Linkerkulturmafia. Finally, Part 4 introduces the 
ideological construct of the ‘Austrian Idea’ – which underpinned the cultural stance taken by 
Haider’s FPÖ. 
                                                            
14 Some of the main arguments and findings of this case study was published in an article by the Author (Murphy in the ÖZP 2004/3, p297 
– 307) 
15 Here, Kulturkampf refers to an often repeated phenomenon in Austrian history where avant-garde intellectuals and artists are singled 
out by the populist and/or fascist political parties as a political target – my assertion in this study is that Haider instigated this political 
strategy for political purposes in the 1990s. 
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Kultur is a concept that plays a far greater role in Austrian political discourse than in 
countries like Britain or the United States. Indeed, Michael Wimmer (a leading member of 
an Austrian cultural think-tank) noted that the Austrian-Hapsburg cultural heritage: 
“Was the most enduring institution in Austrian society...outlasting two world wars, Austro-
fascism and even National Socialism”. (Wimmer in Transcript, 2002). 
He also remarked that it would easily outlive the current turbulence around Haider. The fact 
that the FPÖ decided to enter the political arena with their own cultural agenda is (in this 
context) no surprise. However, there is little evidence of any other Right-wing populist party 
in Europe prioritizing culture and aesthetics in their party programme to the extent that the 
FPÖ did in the 1990s. 
In their Kulturkampf during the 1990s the FPÖ attacked their newly adopted enemy which 
Haider called the Linkekulturmafia (literally – ‘the Left-wing cultural mafia’), a loose term for 
avant-garde artists, socialist politicians, intellectuals etc. Haider explains this himself in an 
introduction to a chapter about Kultur in one of his books: 
“This section of the book is dedicated to my special friends. The cultural producers, cultural 
journalists, cultural consumers, cultural politicians, cultural fighters, cultural defenders, 
cultural revolutionaries, cultural critics, and all the other cultivated people, who in the past 
pursued a cult that saw itself as part of an élite - separate from others, above all the 
Freedom Party”. (Haider, 1997, p67) 
Haider's FPÖ took the moral high ground on cultural issues of 'taste' in an attempt to appeal 
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to a general antipathy towards modern art and avant-garde artists that was already present 
in the wider population (Menasse, 2005). The party also launched an aggressive campaign 
against a selection of artists and intellectuals that resonated with the drive against entartete 
Kunst (degenerate art) by the Nazis during the 1930s (Scharsach, 1992, p81). This venture 
into the cultural-political arena by Haider can be seen as part of their overall populist 
political strategy. In addition, I think it exposes important aspects that contribute to a better 
understanding of Haider’s FPÖ that I shall expand upon further in the study. At this stage it 
is important to note that Kultur did, at various times in the 1990s, take centre stage in the 
FPÖs political campaign of the 1990s.  
Haider claimed that this cultural élite in Austria was receiving too much state money to 
produce ‘experimental’ art, variously described by the FPÖ as ‘obscene’, ‘rubbish’ 
‘provocative’ or even ‘unpatriotic’ (Marinovic, 1995). Two aspects of the party’s cultural 
stance are useful to mention here. Firstly, any analysis of their cultural policies reveals a 
right-wing core which viewed art as the cultural production of a nation or ‘Volk’ rather than 
an individual act of ‘self-expression’. This view has a clear parallel with the National Socialist 
disdain for modern art, which it labelled in the 1930s as ‘degenerate’ and pursued a state 
cultural policy of encouraging  ‘Real German Art’: 
“Just like in the time of the Third Reich, many representatives of modern art have now been 
singled out. With similar anti-art rhetoric as the Nazis, ‘cultural experts’ from the FPÖ’s 
right-wing faction exploit the fact that many ordinary people have a difficult relationship 
with contemporary art “ (translated from Scharsach, 1992, p81). 
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Secondly, In the 1990s, right-wing ‘intellectuals’ within the FPÖ such as Andreas Mölzer16 
started to formulate an ideological stance for the party about Kultur based on the theories 
of the Italian Marxist Antonio Gramsci (Zogholy, 2001, p7). The basis of this theoretical 
analysis was an assertion that the Left in Austria (and elsewhere) were focusing their 
political strategy on achieving ‘cultural hegemony’17 as a basis for influencing and setting the 
political agenda. As a result, Mölzer asserted that most of contemporary artistic production 
in Austria was brimming with an ‘overt’ left-wing agenda, was of little artistic merit and is 
usually provocative or obscene in its content. He stated that it was the task of the FPÖ to 
counter this ‘cultural threat’ from the Left (Ibid, p19). 
Kulturkampf 1995 
The FPÖ’s Kulturkampf during the 1990s produced many examples of conflicts arising 
between the FPÖ and the avant-garde in Austria. Demonstrations would take place outside 
controversial or ‘obscene’ exhibitions, particularly those held by the Austrian actionist artist, 
Hermann Nitsch. Claus Peymann, the director of the Vienna ‘Burgtheater’ was constantly 
being accused of showing ‘rubbish’ and of being a ‘dangerous left-winger’ with ‘links to 
terrorism’ (Marinovic, 1995, p42). The party was also formulating a policy of cutting state 
                                                            
16 Haider’s ‘Cultural Advisor’ until 2000 
17 Haider’s use of the term ‘kulturelle Hegenomie’ is an important theoretical basis for the whole project of FPÖ Kulturpolitik in the 1990s. 
I shall expand on this later in the study. 
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subsidies to ‘unsuitable’ artists and proposed the creation of a ‘free art market’ in Austria. 
The details of this Kulturkampf will be analysed in this case study. 
However, in 1995 there was a particularly notorious and very public display of Haider’s 
Kulturkampf. A general election campaign poster that was plastered all over Vienna during 
the October 1995 formulated a particularly aggressive stance by the party on contemporary 
art in Austria and set the scene for an escalation of confrontation between the avant-garde 
in Austria and Haider’s FPÖ (English Translation ‘Do you like Scholten, Jelinek, Häupl, 
Peymann, Pasterk…OR Art and Culture? Freedom of Art instead of Socialist State Artists – 
The Viennese Freedomites’): 
 
This poster was a significant statement by the FPÖ in their ongoing clash with contemporary 
art production in Austria. It was only put up around Vienna, due to the city’s overriding 
importance for Austrian culture and where most artists and cultural figures are located. The 
poster promoted the FPÖ’s populist policies in the cultural arena, notably to curb state 
subsidies for certain types of art and to not waste tax-payers money on ‘meaningless drivel 
calling itself art’ (Ibid, p13). In addition, the FPÖ attempted to position itself as a ‘defender’ 
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of public morals and ‘common sense’ by highlighting works of art considered ‘unacceptable 
to ordinary people’. An FPÖ spokesperson, Magda Bleckmann, stated: 
“Most of what passes as art these days is subsidised by the state and celebrated by an artistic 
élite and produces rejection and disgust amongst ordinary people. It even leads to citizens 
disconnecting from art completely”. (FPÖ Jahrbuch 1996, p386). 
Apart from the populist electoral appeal of including a cultural agenda in the FPÖ’s political 
strategy, there are four additional aspects of the 1995 campaign poster that illustrate the 
FPÖ’s parochial and anti-modernist political character (Zogholy, 2001, p53). Firstly, the party 
is indicating that it possesses its own definition of ‘art and culture’ according to the FPÖ. By 
putting certain artists, cultural figures and politicians in one basket and juxtaposing these 
against ‘art and culture’, the implication is that these people are supporting and producing 
things of no artistic merit. Just what is ‘art’ is not defined by the FPÖ, their main concern 
here is to devalue and reject most of the contemporary artistic production in Austria with 
little effort to replace it with ‘suitable’ notions of aesthetic criteria. 
Secondly, by plastering Vienna with this poster, Haider’s FPÖ were embarking on a 
campaign of attacking individual artists, something unprecedented in political discourse 
since before the war. This politicisation of culture draws an obvious parallel with the attack 
against Entartete Kunst (degenerate art) by the Nazis during 1930s. Defaming and openly 
criticising artists and their works are normally out of bounds for mainstream political 
parties. Such concerns for the consequences of their actions were set aside by the FPÖ for 
the sake of electoral gain. 
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Thirdly, Haider was walking a political tightrope involving his implementation of a populist 
political strategy while still needing the support and sponsorship of the far-right ‘core’ of the 
party. Haider managed this by championing causes like honouring the ‘war generation’ - 
which often involved controversial statements understood by many as ‘playing down’ the 
brutal and criminal nature of the Third Reich. Another example of an issue that would 
appeal to this ‘core’ was to attack modern art. Therefore, by embarking on a Kulturkampf 
with the Austrian avant-garde and ‘defending’ Austro-German Kultur, Haider was placating 
the far-right core of the party. 
The fourth aspect of this Kulturkampf was that by attacking artists, the FPÖ targeted a group 
of people virtually unanimous in their opposition and resistance to Haider, who labelled 
them the Linkerkulturmafia (the left-wing cultural mafia). In effect, Haider was trying to 
expose these people as belonging to a left-wing cultural élite, bent on producing art for 
specific political purposes and rejecting any association with ‘proper’ German cultural 
values. 
Targeting ‘Left-Wing’ Culture 
Who were the ‘usual suspects’ targeted in the FPÖ’s Kulturkampf and why? In order to 
answer this I will illuminate four examples of significant cultural figures that have 
experienced the condemnation and arguably defamation at the hands of Haider’s FPÖ. They 
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are prime examples of the Linkerkulturmafia - an artist, an author, a theatre director and an 
SPÖ politician18. 
Hermann Nitsch 
Hermann Nitsch is an artist who began doing public performances of his work in the early 
1960s. He belonged to an artistic movement called the ‘Viennese Actionists’, the other main 
artists in this movement were Günter Brus, Otto Mühl and Rudolf Schwarzkogler (Klocker et 
al, 2008). They distinguished themselves by holding controversial, ‘taboo-breaking’ 
performances which not only challenged the boundaries of artistic taste, but also the 
legitimacy and credibility of the Austrian post-war political establishment. The most 
notorious ‘happening’ took place in 1968 when the whole group performed an ‘action’ at 
the University of Vienna (Fellner, 1997, p200). They proceeded to defecate, strip off 
clothing, and shout abuse and other ‘degrading’ activities while simultaneously singing the 
Austrian national anthem. The point of this ‘action’ was to expose (through shocking 
performance art) the hypocrisy and ‘fascist’ character of post-war Austria – a country 
steeped in parochialism and in denial of its nazi past. Politicians and media reacted by 
incarcerating two of the artists (Nitsch and Mühl) while another (Brus) escaped to exile in 
Germany. 
The Viennese Actionists broke up in the early 1970s. Nitsch continued his own public 
performances as well as painting canvasses, where he concentrated on religious and 
                                                            
18 Note that three of those I have chosen to mention here were specifically mentioned in the FPÖ’s 1995 campaign poster – i.e. Jelinek, 
Scholten and Peymann 
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mythological themes. Some of his happenings involve several days of ritualistic activity 
including the symbolic slaughter of animals, crucifixion and the use of blood as paint on 
canvas (Klocker et al, 2008). Nitsch intends to instil a catharsis in his audience and 
participants with an art form that strives for the ‘truth and uncovering hidden human traits’ 
(Nitsch in Scharsach, 2000, p248).  
For the FPÖ, Nitsch epitomises the ‘degenerate’ state of Austrian contemporary art. They 
describe his art as ‘obscene’ ‘indecent’ and ‘disgusting’. They object to the ‘cruel’ use of 
animals, sacrilegious displays of religious symbols and the ‘stomach-turning’ elements of 
blood, vomit and urine in his work (Marinovic, 1995, p.59). Nitsch is a main target of FPÖ 
attacks on the state of Austrian art. The quality of this art does not even merit the use of 
this term for some in the FPÖ. A leading Kulturkämpfer in FPÖ circles, Walter Marinovich 
describes him as an ‘orgy-artist’ using ‘vomit as art’ (Ibid, p60). 
Aside from criticizing the content of Nitsch’s art, the FPÖ also highlights the support and 
sponsoring of such art from the Austrian state. As a result of this ‘infection’ of the 
Linkerkulturmafia in Austrian culture since the socialist dominated Kreisky era (1970-1983), 
artists such as Nitsch are now held up as ‘state’ artists, representing Austria in international 
art exhibitions. This situation, that Nitsch has become the acceptable face of Austrian art, is 
indicative of how public morals and German-Austrian Kultur have been ‘dragged through 
the mud’. A type of ‘crusade’ is necessary to re-establish ‘old’ and ‘decent’ values (Ibid, 
p71). The manifestation of the FPÖ’s distaste for Nitsch is ongoing with regular 
demonstrations, media attacks and political pressure to prevent his exhibitions and stop 
state support for his art. While the vilifying of Nitsch became more difficult in the face of his 
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growing international reputation, he remains a specific hate-figure for the FPÖ under their 
new leader, Heinz-Christian Strache. 
Elfriede Jelinek 
Jelinek is a contemporary Austrian playwright and author. Writing since the 1960s, she has 
become one of the most famous female authors in the German language. Her style and 
method of writing has been described as innovative and socially critical in a similar vein to 
the renowned post-war Austrian author, Thomas Bernhard (Konzett, 2000, p.93). Her 
subject matters are mainly concerned with subjects such as women, sexuality, taboo-ridden 
Austrian society and anti-Semitism. Her critical and challenging works have long been a 
thorn in the side of the Kulturkämpfer within the FPÖ. 
Unlike in the case of Nitsch, Jelinek has also been willing to take a public stance on many 
political issues. In particular she has tried to expose the hypocritical post-war Austrian myth 
of Austria having been the ‘first victim’ of German National Socialism (Konzett, 2000, p.95). 
Jelinek sees her task as a critical artist to expose and bring such themes up to the surface 
and in the consciousness of ordinary people: 
“Particularly in countries with strong authoritarian structures like Austria, art is the only 
critical institution” (Jelinek in Scharsach, 2000, p239) 
Jelinek was targeted by the FPÖ for several reasons. Firstly, the content of her works 
(particularly her plays) is condemned as ‘pornographic’, ‘perverse’ and of ‘low quality’ (Die 
Zeit, 2000). She is accused of using ‘obscenity’ in order to be ‘provocative’ rather than trying 
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to produce ‘quality’ productions. Secondly, her work is seen as ‘anti-patriotic’. By focusing 
on themes such as Austria’s Nazi legacy, Jelinek is dredging up her own ‘warped’ version of 
the past in order to criticise and condemn the credibility of the Second Republic (Ibid). She is 
a typical ‘Österreichbeschimpfer’ (an Austrian ‘insulter’) intent on bringing Austria’s 
reputation into disrepute (Marinovich, 1995, p7). Thirdly, the FPÖ thinks of Jelinek as a 
‘darling of the left’ – who serves the left-wing agenda of Austrian cultural ‘hacks’ who are 
only interested in furthering their own political agenda at the expense of the FPÖ. Her works 
are staged for the sake of political provocation rather than artistic merit or popularity and 
the Left is always assured a voice through the ‘cultural mouthpiece’ of Jelinek. Finally, 
Haider’s FPÖ rejects artists who are intent on political ‘interference’, artists should 
concentrate on producing ‘works of beauty’ rather than wasting their time with political 
agitation (Haider, 1997, p71). 
Interestingly, after the aforementioned poster campaign in Vienna for the 1995 general 
election, the FPÖ gave a public and ‘official’ apology to Jelinek for her inclusion in the 
poster’s wording (Profil, 14/2/2000). She was the only ‘artist’ named in the poster, all the 
others being politicians and cultural figures. Implicit in this act of contrition by the FPÖ is, as 
is often the case, the feeling by ‘moderates’ in the party that the radical right of the party 
had ‘overstepped’ the mark again. In this case the unprecedented ‘naming’ and ‘shaming’ of 
an internationally reputable Austrian writer by a political party. 
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Claus Peymann 
Claus Peymann became director of the prestigious Vienna Burgtheater in 1988. He already 
had a track record as a controversial director with distinct left-wing views. True to form, his 
first production was Thomas Bernhard’s Heldenplatz in 1988, a play satirising and exposing 
Austrian complicity with National Socialism (Bailer-Galanda, 1995, p123). The FPÖ was 
amongst other groups that held demonstrations against the showing of the premiere in 
1988. Other notable productions from Peymann were the ‘obscene’ (Marinovich, 1997, p43) 
play by Jelinek called Raststätte and an ‘evening talk’ by Otto Mühl (a fellow actionist with 
Hermann Nitsch) in the Burgtheater shortly after finishing a seven year prison sentence on 
charges of having sex with minors. 
For Haider, Peymann was intent on pushing his own radical-left agenda through a state-
cultural institution (Burgtheater) and thereby ‘radicalising’ the political climate. The FPÖ 
quote Peymann as saying: 
“Theatre should, in many ways, be an example of socialist cultural politics” (Translated from 
Marinovic, 1995, p51) 
Peymann was also held responsible by the FPÖ for the declining audience figures during his 
tenure (he left in 1999). They alleged this was due to the obscurity and radical political 
content of his productions. The FPÖ maintained that people such as Peymann have no 
connection with ‘ordinary’ people who want art to provide them with solace and 
entertainment rather than abstraction, indecency and agitprop. Haider stated after 
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Peymann’s Heldenplatz production (based on a famous quote by the Viennese satirical 
writer Karl Kraus):  
“Hinaus mit diesem Schuft aus Wien! Throw out the scoundrel from Vienna!” (Bailer-
Galanda, 1995, p123) 
Rudolf Scholten 
Scholten was the SPÖ’s Minister of Art and Science during the 1990s. Haider accuses 
Scholten of ignoring the wishes and taste of ordinary Austrians by subsidising art which was 
either blatantly ‘left-wing’ or ‘morally repugnant’ (or both!). For the FPÖ he is an example of 
how art has been used by the left for the propaganda purposes - a politician at the behest of 
a Kulturmafia intent on ruining the cultural inheritance and reputation of Austria: 
“Which, or better said whose, freedom is it, when some artists are scraping an existence 
while an art minister Scholten, despite empty seats in the Bürgtheater, takes the freedom to 
throw subsidies at the Peymanns, Nitschs and Mühls of this world? Freedom of art is fine, 
but the waste and abuse of taxpayers’ money is not art and has never been free”. (Haider in 
Bailer-Galanda, 1995, p123) 
All these and many other representatives of the Linkerkulturmafia in Austria were the object 
of a significant political campaign by the FPÖ. However once a political party takes a distinct 
position on culture, the question arises as to what their own definition of Kultur is and the 
aesthetic criteria for an FPÖ Kultur. In short, they made it clear what they dislike about 
contemporary Austrian art but what type of culture do they sanction and promote? 
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Part 2. A Freedom Party Kultur? 
 
“The extreme-right goes on a lot about a lot about art and even more about culture. Less is 
spoken about what these concepts mean to them. What isn’t art and culture, they write 
whole books about. Their own definition of these concepts, apart from using some Nazi 
terminology, is not very developed” (Tieber, 1996, p60) 
This quotation can be applied to the FPÖ, most certainly the far-right faction of the party. In 
fact, defining concepts and formulating policies has been a constant problem for the FPÖ – 
not only in the field of culture. This was exposed when they entered into government with 
the ÖVP in February 2000, where they presented a vague and incoherent set of actual 
policies. The internal strife within the party and pressure from the far-right faction led to the 
resignation of three FPÖ ministers and the eventual fall of the FPÖ/ÖVP government in 2002 
(Sperl, 2000). In the field of cultural politics, a similar pattern can be traced. Opposition to, 
and condemnation of, the ‘cultural mafia’ might score some political points, but as soon as 
the FPÖ tried to define what they actually mean by Kultur things become much less 
straightforward. 
In order to uncover the content of FPÖ Kultur I have used three sources of information. 
Firstly the FPÖ’s 2000 Manifesto (FPÖ Partei Program, Chapter 15, 2000), which contains a 
chapter called ‘Weite Kultur - Freie Kunst’ (Broad Culture - Free Art). Secondly, the writings 
of Haider himself and some podium discussions organised by the FPÖ and attended by 
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Haider on the theme of ‘art and culture’ (Berchtold, 1998). Finally, various Kulturexperten 
within the FPÖ have attempted to define a ‘Freedomite Culture’ in interviews, books and 
pamphlets. Drawing on these sources I will try and piece together what can be understood 
under the notion of an FPÖ Kultur. 
Kulturdeutsch 
The FPÖ’s 2000 manifesto (FPÖ Partei Program, Ch.15, 2000) states the party view that the 
basic vehicle of cultural expression is through language: 
“The ‘Freedomite’ movement emphasises the fact that all Austrians belong to different 
cultural communities based on their particular language; for the vast majority of Austrians 
that means German” (Ibid, p132) 
Here, the FPÖ are advocating that Austrian identity is inextricably linked to a German 
cultural identity. By emphasising the German aspect of Austrian identity, Haider wishes to 
instil a sense of belonging to a wider, historic, cultural community than just Austria. More 
significantly he wishes to defend this Austrian-German culture from being infected and 
influenced by multiculturalism (Haider, 1995, p28). Here, the FPÖ wishes to promote a sense 
of belonging to a cultural community by an affirmation of an Austro-German identity 
through the exclusion of other cultures, ethnic groups and foreign influences that in their 
view do not belong or ‘contaminate’ Austrian culture. The components of this ‘identity’ are 
vague and are much more defined by what the FPÖ rejects rather than affirms in the 
context of national identity. 
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The reasons for this special identification with German culture lie in the historic roots of the 
FPÖ. The ideological basis of the party since 1949 was ‘Pan-Germanism’ (Stäuber, University 
of Zürich, 1974) and it was the only post-war Austrian political party that continued to 
challenge the legitimacy of an ‘Austrian’ state. Haider himself, before becoming leader in 
1986, was a leading sympathizer with German-nationalist elements in the party. However, 
on achieving party leadership in 1986, he realised that the popularity of Germany and 
German nationalism in Austria was relatively small and certainly not a vote-winning issue 
(see chapter 3). He steered the party away from overt pan-Germanism and its implicit 
challenge to Austrian state legitimacy. By emphasising the German dimension of Austrian 
culture, rather than in the area of political legitimacy, Haider tried to reinforce an Austro-
German cultural identity without questioning the legitimacy of the Second Republic: 
“Recognising that Austria forms part of the German cultural region, the cultivation of 
German culture and language is of special importance to us. We consider it our duty to 
provide an Austrian contribution to the development of German culture”. (Haider, 1995, p95) 
Andreas Mölzer, in an article about the collapse of the FPÖ/ÖVP coalition wrote: 
“The former Third Camp, cultural-German and independent, remains, with a reduced 
electorate, part of the political landscape of this country”. (Kurier, 1.10.2002) 
Anti-Modern & Anti-Avant-Garde 
The FPÖ have a marked distaste for ‘modern’ art, in particular the works of contemporary 
Austrian artists who they see as intent on producing works they have variously described as 
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‘rubbish’, ‘filth’, ‘perverse’ (Gratzer, 1998, p109). When the party’s critique of modern art 
was extended to attacking individual artists in the 1990s, a comparison with the National 
Socialist assault on modern art became inevitable. Hitler was an energetic Kulturkämpfer, 
and was responsible for staging the infamous Entartete Kunst Austellung (Degenerate Art 
Exhibition) in Munich, 1937. The exhibition contained a large selection of ‘degenerate’ 
works of art by artists labelled as ‘Jewish’ and ‘Cultural Bolsheviks’. Hitler thought that 
modern art was ‘confusing the natural concepts about nature’ (Hitler in Chipp, 1968, p475). 
By the inauguration of the ‘Great Exhibition of German Art’ in 1937, Hitler noted that 
Germany’s modern decline occurred not only in the political and economic realm, but also 
the cultural: 
“Germany’s collapse and general decline had been - as we know - not only economic or 
political, but probably to a much greater extent, cultural” (Ibid, p474). 
The zeal and brutality with which the Nazis attacked modern art cannot be compared with 
the present-day FPÖ. However the linking of moral and social decline to cultural production 
reflects a distinct tendency of the FPÖ to reproduce aspects of National Socialist ideology in 
a contemporary setting. No other right-wing populist party in Europe has entered into the 
field of aesthetics to the extent that the FPÖ did under Haider. For some within the party 
the former scapegoat of ‘cultural Jewish-Bolshevism’ has been replaced with the new one - 
a ‘left-wing cultural mafia’ (Scharsach, 1992, p83).  
The FPÖ’s Kulturkampf also has roots in an adherence to a kind of German ‘fundamentalism’ 
(Klinger, 1992, p.522). Here, the ‘rejection’ of modernity results from the ‘erosion of natural 
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cultural forces’ for which modernity is responsible. To combat this, more traditional and 
‘healthy’ attitudes in people need to be encouraged. In this context, modern art represents 
for the FPÖ a manifestation of ‘pathological’ tendencies that should be challenged and 
eventually eradicated for the sake of a people’s ‘psychic health’. Marinovic claims that much 
of contemporary art in Austria should not be called ‘art’, he even states that whereas the 
‘degenerate art’ of the 1930s could still be described as (albeit misguided) ‘art’ – most 
contemporary art production: 
“…has nothing to do with art, it is not even degeneration, but in the best cases an indication 
of mental or psychological disturbance” (Marinovich in Tieber, 1996, p73). 
The final aspect behind Haider’s targeting of the Austrian avant-garde is that modern art is 
particularly unpopular with ordinary people in Austria. Due to religious, social and political 
developments, particularly in the twentieth century (see chapter 1), the perception of 
modern art being comprised of a cultural élite producing meaningless, often abstract works 
that cannot even be called ‘art’ has taken root. The FPÖ recognised a political opportunity 
that by attacking certain artists they were merely representing the views of the majority of 
Austrians who were ‘alienated’ from the contemporary art scene. They propagated that for 
most people Kultur is the music of Mozart or the architecture of the baroque - not the 
ritualistic blood splattering of Nitsch or the ‘ugly’ verses of Jelinek. 
Morality and Culture 
Haider’s political success affected the ‘core’ ideology of the party. It’s adherence to ‘pan-
Germanism’ was diluted and channelled into the cultural rather than the political arena. 
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Another party principle to come under scrutiny was ‘anti-clericalism’ (Pelinka, 1998, p9), 
which entailed an antipathy to Roman Catholic Church and political opposition to the 
‘catholic’ ÖVP. The FPÖ were traditionally hostile to political interference by the Catholic 
Church and its perceived pervasiveness in Austrian society. Haider changed this policy (see 
chapter 3). His reasoning was simple: in order to increase the party’s share of the vote it was 
necessary to cast a wider net amongst the general population. Certain previously held 
principles, such as anti-clericalism, were off-putting for potential voters, especially those 
switching from the ÖVP. 
This ideological shift was motivated in part by political opportunism but there was another 
factor influencing FPÖ strategy at this time. This was Haider’s idea that the party had to take 
a stance on ‘morality’, in particular the notion of ‘family values’. Haider’s deeply 
conservative views on these matters, such as the role of women ‘at home’; draconian ways 
of dealing with the drug problem; and other notions of ‘public responsibility’ - all these and 
similar issues led to the FPÖ sharing the same moral platform as the Catholic Church (Hofer, 
1998). 
The FPÖ’s reactionary views on contemporary art, especially their criticisms of ‘obscene’ or 
‘pornographic’ art, are shared by many in the Catholic Church and the ÖVP. Arising out of 
the FPÖ’s electoral successes, Austria experienced a change in the political landscape 
whereby the main conservative (or reactionary) forged an alliance around certain issues, 
one of these being Kultur. Both parties wanted to promote traditional forms of culture at 
the expense of modern, critical or experimental art. Thus, while differences remained on 
issues such as tax or Europe, they saw eye to eye on art and culture. Haider increasingly 
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portrayed himself as a ‘protector’ of ‘decency, honesty and proper behaviour’ (Wodak in 
Scharsach, 2000, p.180) during the 1990s. The party’s distinct stance on Kultur reinforced 
these ‘Austrian’ values and also helped the political marriage with the ÖVP and the tacit 
support of the Austrian Catholic Church. 
Artistic Freedom….But....... 
The Freedom Party’s Kulturpolitik is played out mostly in the realm of party rhetoric or 
media posturing. There are also differences of opinion between hard-line Kulturkämpfer and 
‘official’ party policy. When scrutinising their party documents, one can identify three areas 
in which the FPÖ have put forward some specific ideas for cultural policy in Austria. Firstly, 
on the question of state subsidies for cultural projects and artists; Secondly, their proposals 
for an ‘art market’; and thirdly - the ‘Freedomite’ notion of artistic freedom and censorship.  
1. Subsidising Art: The cultural policy proposal that was publicised the most by the FPÖ was 
for a radical overhaul of the system of state subsidies for artists and cultural institutions. 
The FPÖ exploited a view held by many Austrians that their taxpayer’s money was being 
wasted on art and culture that was unpopular and out of touch with the wishes ordinary 
people. Haider took this public perception further by claiming that these state subsidies are 
politically motivated in order to support and nurture certain ‘types’ of art – i.e. 
contemporary art. The party provides evidence of this apparent state ‘bias’ in cultural 
politics by highlighting the policies of Rudolf Scholten (previous SPÖ Minister of Arts and 
Science – see above) who is they accused: 
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“…..the building up of a social-democratic cultural system, dependent on the subsidised 
handouts of Mr Scholten” (Bleckmann in FPÖ Jahrbuch, 1996, p390) 
Haider sees this type of state support as having no relation to artistic quality or public 
popularity but as another example of the Left trying to extend its ‘control’ over society: 
“For me it is clear that in Austria, in many areas of art and culture, there is a sort of 
subsidised movement towards cultural hegemony, which is being planned and enacted by 
politicians and powerful institutions”. (Haider in Berchtold, 1998, p84) 
Haider notes that this type of state expenditure on culture benefits only a small and elitist 
minority of ‘culture hacks’ with the political motivation of marginalising Haider and the FPÖ. 
For the public, cultural subsidies represent the ‘subsidisation of boredom’ (Haider, 1997, 
p.70) whereby people are alienated from art as a result of being presented with exhibitions, 
theatre plays and opera which are either meaningless or simply ‘rubbish’ (Ibid, p.71). 
2. An Art Market: The FPÖ makes a link between the issue of an ‘over-generous’ and 
‘politically biased’ cultural state subsidies to the general question of the role of the state in 
Austria. One of Haider’s main political messages has been the ‘bloated and bureaucratic’ 
nature of the Austrian modern state, which is ‘interfering in people’s lives’ (Sully, 1997, 
p.44). The effect on the Austrian cultural scene is that, unlike in most other European 
countries, there is no properly functioning ‘art market’. This results in an artificial situation 
being created where the state ‘props up’ artists and cultural projects instead of allowing an 
art market to develop based on ‘supply and demand’: 
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“We stand for a culture which reflects the free development of the citizen and society. It is 
the state’s responsibility to preserve our cultural heritage; contemporary art has to orient 
itself to supply and demand and not political influence and subsidies. State support should be 
limited to preserving plurality in education and arts”. (Haider, 1995, p110) 
It should be noted here that the FPÖ was not alone in criticising this aspect of cultural 
policy, in fact, Austria subsidizes the arts more than virtually any country in the world 
(Menasse, 1997, p.177) For many, on all sides of the political spectrum, the role of the state 
in, and its overbearing influence on, Austrian culture - is badly in need of analysis and 
reform (Ibid, p.179). However, for the FPÖ this ‘reform’ would be used as a tool for dealing 
with political enemies and marginalising critical art forms rather than a balanced policy 
reform package (Ibid, p180). 
3. Artistic Freedom and Censorship: The third area of FPÖ cultural policy relates to the 
controversial question of ‘artistic freedom’. The bulk of Freedom Party writing on this 
subject concerns how the state should set the ‘boundaries’ of artistic taste: 
“…one shouldn’t just say anyone can do anything, instead I consider there to be a boundary - 
for example - between artistic expression and pornography”. (Haider in Berchtold, 1998, 
p92) 
For the FPÖ, art should be supported and displayed within a system of ‘collective 
responsibility’ and should not used as an excuse for unbridled individual expression. The 
public should be protected from art that contains indecency, political provocation, obscenity 
or ‘irrational rubbish’: 
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“ ...freedom of art, culture and the media can only be looked at when connected with the 
concept of responsibility” (Bleckmann in FPÖ Jahrbuch, 1996, p388) 
Haider’s notion of ‘artistic responsibility’ involves anchoring culture to the ‘people’ rather 
than catering for the ‘tastes’ of cultural élites. Another cultural spokesman within the FPÖ, 
Peter Sichrovsky, criticised artists who are trying to ‘resist’ the FPÖ’s Kulturpolitik. He claims 
that they are doing this within the context of living in a democratic liberal-democracy and 
that their calls for ‘freedom’ reflect more their own artistic redundancy than a genuine cry 
for the ‘freedom of art’: 
“The cries of offended individuals (i.e. artists) for freedom in a democratic system - says 
more about their insecurity in a particular system to produce works of artistic merit”. 
(Sichrovsky in FPÖ Jahrbuch, 1997, p344) 
For Sichrovsky, a new and reformed Freedom Party Kultur would include a fairer system of 
subsidies; a ‘free’ art market with less state intervention; and more artistic responsibility. In 
this new Kultur, many Austrian contemporary artists and artistic forms (particularly those 
targeted by the FPÖ!) would simply disappear from the cultural landscape. Their 
disappearance would not be as a result of draconian censorship but based on a lack of 
artistic merit; public demand being taken into account; and a more ‘democratically’ 
functioning art market (Ibid, p347). 
Any attempt at a definition of FPÖ Kultur reveals the minefield a political party enters when 
trying to make a specific stance on cultural matters. Issues such as censorship, artistic 
freedom, aesthetic criteria and political interference all make it a difficult area for 
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politicians. The FPÖ Kulturpolitik of the 1990s was an attempt to make political capital by 
populist criticism of an easy target - modern art; in fact given that Haider tried to transform 
pan-Germanism into a cultural phenomenon, this political strategy can be seen as a 
necessary strategy in the reconfiguration of the party under Haider. However, in the process 
of doing this, the party unleashed its hard-line Kulturkämpfer, exposing itself to accusations 
of trying to ‘purify’ Austrian culture in a similar way to the National Socialist project of the 
1930s (Scharsach, 1992, p82). In a declaration released in 1989 one of these rightwing 
‘think-tanks’ within the FPÖ called the Lorenzer Kreis set out their view on art and culture – 
a view that is indicative of many within the party: 
“Cultural subsidies must only be for works that belong to our Western tradition and have 
proper artistic merit...Taxpayer’s money should never be used for such things as ‘Viennese 
Actionism’; blasphemous depictions; for all works that insult the feelings of our people, our 
homeland and our traditions and those that exploit these for money. Also the support for 
works using alien means of expression or those that subvert our Western traditions - e.g. 
primitive art, far eastern works and ‘sub-cultures’ - are to be rejected”. (Gratzer, 1998, p107) 
A War of Ideas 
Behind the FPÖ’s cultural-political strategy and their proposals for new cultural policies is a 
theoretical basis that seeks to justify and explain the party’s Kulturkämpf in the 1990s. It 
borrows and adapts concepts from the writings of Antonio Gramsci, the Italian Marxist who 
wrote most of his work while in prison under Mussolini during the 1930s. Gramsci is noted 
for extending Marxist theory from the economic-political to the cultural-political realm. He 
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introduced the concept of ‘hegemony’ - whereby political power is derived not just from 
economic control and ownership of the means of production but through a domination of 
the cultural sphere - encompassing art, media and education. 
Intellectuals within the FPÖ such as Mölzer took ideas from right-wing scholars in France, 
notably those of Alain de Benoist. De Benoist had formed a think tank called the ‘New Right’ 
(Zogholy, 2001, p.29), which had revised Gramsci’s theory of hegemony and applied it to the 
political aims of the Right. A central aspect of this theory was the use of Kultur as a vehicle 
for obtaining political power. In the context of Austria in the 1990s, the FPÖ interpreted this 
as the theoretical basis for attacking the ‘domination’ of Austrian cultural institutions and 
ideas by the Left: 
“And the goal of this war of ideas is culture, which is where ideas and values are examined 
and subsequently distributed” (Benoist in Zogholy, p34) 
In view of the fact that Mölzer was a personal advisor to Haider in the early 1990s, it is of 
little surprise that Haider formulated a central task of the FPÖ cultural-political strategy as 
the “fight against the cultural hegemony of the Left” (Haider, 1995, p73).  
Zöchling points to the meaning of art and culture for Haider: 
“Art and Culture are the vehicle with which to obtain political hegemony. As the governor of 
Carinthia his first action was the takeover of the Department of Art and Culture”. (Zöchling, 
1999, p156) 
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The apparent ‘necessary war of ideas’ (Marinovic, nr.55, November, 1996) in order to 
achieve political ascendancy involved a Kulturkämpf targeting the pervasive influence of the 
left in the cultural sphere and thereby placing the FPÖ in the position of creating some kind 
of ‘new symbolic arrangement for the Second Republic’ (Charim in Kulturrisse, Jan 2001). 
Here, political power would be achieved by challenging the ‘control’ of Kultur by the Left. 
This aim to ‘control’ Kultur also included (apart from targeting the avant-garde) Haider 
trying to promote the FPÖ as a party that was able to embrace contemporary youth culture. 
An example of this is the FPÖ staging ‘youth events’ including a ‘Haider Rap’ being written 
and party recruitment taking place at discos. (Gingrich in Wodak, 2002, chapter 5) 
Underlying this Kulturkämpf was the strongly held belief, which took on almost 
conspiratorial dimensions, that the left had ‘taken over’ cultural institutions and therefore 
achieved political power: 
“Social and cultural life have become to a large degree separated. It is this factor which has 
given rise to intellectual domination by the left in the cultural sector of a system based on 
market economy”. (Haider, 1995, p21) 
Haider traces this ‘domination of the cultural sector’ to the 1960s: 
“For the generation of 1968 it was necessary to smash domination of bourgeois thought, to 
criticize capitalism, America and everyone over 30, to get cultural hegemony. Their march 
through the institutions was successful”. (Haider, 1995, p22). 
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In effect, the political strategy of the FPÖ was not simply a competition between the 
Austrian political parties but also a campaign to ‘re-conquer’ the institutions of Austria that 
had been dominated by the Linkerkulturmafia since the 1960s (Marinovic, 1995). 
I would argue that the ideological basis for the FPÖ’s Kulturkampf had several noteworthy 
aspects. Firstly, it anchored the FPÖs cultural policies during the 1990s to a specific political 
goal through which the party would gain political power. Secondly, a (Germanic) 
fundamentalist strand of thought is revealed within the FPÖ whereby the Left is as not only 
seen as having gained political power through ‘the march through institutions’ but has also 
manipulated and distorted peoples’ minds in Austria - creating a so-called ‘Dictatorship of 
Ugliness’ (Marinovich, 1995): 
“People are robbed of a connection to belief, to their community and their homeland. There 
is no longer a concept of good and evil”. (Marinovich, 1995, p135) 
Thirdly, Haider’s Kulturkämpf can also be justified as a ‘fight-back’ on behalf of the Right to 
re-gain political and moral ascendancy in a society ‘plagued’ by left-wing influence. And 
finally, this ideology of the Right and the belief in the ‘takeover’ by the Left produced a 
creeping paranoia in the party which explains why Kultur took such prominence for the 
party in their oppositional strategy during the 1990s. 
Summary 
There is no doubt that the FPÖ made a political-strategic decision to step into the Austrian 
cultural arena in the 1990s. Although the most public manifestation of this was their poster 
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campaign in 1995, there were many other factors that contributed to their overt stance on 
Kultur, revealing the distinctly parochial character of this political party. While their cultural 
agenda can be seen as part of the populist strategy of the Haider’s FPÖ, it also shows that a 
right-wing core within the party was intent on adopting seemingly retrograde and very 
traditional attitudes towards the avant-garde which were very similar to those of National 
Socialism in the 1930s. Their Kulturkampf also had an ideological rooting which entailed a 
strategy of targeting the apparent ‘hegemony’ of the left in Austria. Another dimension of 
their cultural politics led, in part, to a marriage of convenience with the Catholic Church and 
a political alliance with the ÖVP. 
Once the FPÖ had in fact reached their political holy grail of executive power in February 
2000, it became apparent that the Kulturkampf conducted in previous years would now be 
restricted to just influencing budgetary decisions on arts grants and an attempt to have a 
more direct influence in the state media outlet ORF, Austrian Television (Transcripts, 
January 2002). The attacks on the avant-garde subsided as the party became absorbed into 
the Austrian political class. However, a tense and eventually disruptive conflict was played 
out within the party between those keen on compromise and pragmatism, and the more 
fundamentalist ‘core’ of the FPÖ. By Autumn 2002, three FPÖ ministers resigned and 
precipitated the collapse of the FPÖ/ÖVP coalition. 
The aggressive stance on Kultur taken by Haider and others in the 1990s was an example of 
the extent to which the reactionary right wing of the party was actually steering aspects of 
FPÖ policy. The content of this Kulturpolitik was based on an almost paranoid and 
conspiratorial belief that Austria had to be delivered from the grip of a ‘left-wing cultural 
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mafia’. While this stance became unsustainable in government, it was evidence of a fault-
line within the FPÖ of an irreconcilable tension between the traditional Kultur-Deutsch 
faction of the party and the neo-liberal pragmatists. 
The cultural politics of the FPÖ also enlisted a ‘response’ from those targeted that brought 
artists and cultural figures to the forefront of ‘resistance’ to Haider’s FPÖ. The reaction of 
artists, combined with the surfacing of antagonism towards modernism, is also part of an 
historical pattern arising out of a special status that Kultur (especially since 1945) has taken 
on in the Austrian political arena. Austria has been notable for having a weak civil society 
(Pelinka, 1998) a legacy of authoritarian politics previous to 1945 and the subsequent 
consensus politics after 1945. The Kulturpolitik of the FPÖ and subsequent response of the 
artistic community should therefore be seen in the context of the historical forces affecting 
Austria, particularly since 1945. 
 
Part 3: The Cultural Response 
 
So far, this case study has analyzed the context and content of the FPÖs Kulturkampf in the 
1990s. In this section, I will set out the response from Austrian artists to their political 
campaign. Haider chose to ‘target’ Kultur in Austria as part of his overall quest for power in 
the 1990s, however, as with many aspects of the Haider ‘phenomenon’, there is a revealing 
paradox – Haider actually liked modern art on a personal level – favoring  one of the most 
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prominent of the Kulturmafia – Herman Nitsch(!) (Scharsach, 2000, p42). Thus, like many of 
Haider’s strategies, political expediency would outweigh any more principled concerns. For 
the FPÖ, the collection of artists and cultural figures comprising of the Linkerkulturmafia 
were a useful political target because they contained an assorted variety of people, groups 
and issues which were the antithesis of what the far-right represented i.e. the far-left, 
prominent Jewish cultural figures, multiculturalists, hedonists, degenerate ‘modern’ art and 
even ‘terrorists’19. 
As for the Austrian cultural community – they felt besieged, threatened and were 
subsequently politicized by the actions of Haider’s FPÖ. In fact, my research has shown that 
some of the most active political opposition to Haider came almost exclusively from artistic 
circles in Austria, a point that underlines the historical undercurrent of cultural opposition to 
right-wing populism in Austria. The 1990s brought an historical repetition of how left-wing 
opposition in Austria seems to manifest itself into a Kulturkampf rather than in a more 
mainstream left-wing opposition through trade unions, political parties, student groups etc. 
This historical ‘retreat’ into the cultural arena seems to be something peculiar to Austrian 
politics (Hanisch, 1994) and is therefore a crucial factor in any analysis of Haider’s FPÖ. 
In order to outline the cultural response I have used both primary and secondary sources to 
show some of the most representative responses to Haider from a selection of artists and 
cultural figures in Austria (some of whom have already been mentioned as ‘targets’ of 
                                                            
19 Refers to the German born director of the Vienna Burg Theatre, Claus Peymann, who the FPÖ accused of being sympathetic to the 
Baader Meinhof Group (Marinovic, 1995) 
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Haider’s Kulturkampf earlier in this case-study). The responses are varied - ranging from 
artists who produced works with Haider as their subject-matter to direct political positions 
taken by other Austrian artists. In general, the artistic reaction to Haider’s politics does show 
a strong and active resistance to the far-right from artists.  However, due to the peculiarity 
of Austrian affairs – this cultural resistance to the FPÖ remains confined to the activities of 
an Austrian cultural elite. In fact, most of the political capital gained by politicizing Kultur has 
been to the benefit of Haider’s overall political project of popularizing the far-right by 
demonizing the artistic avant-garde as a minority elite producing ‘ugly’ art subsidized by 
ordinary Austrian taxpayers.  
Subversive Resistance – the ‘Nestbeschmutzer’20 
The cultural avant-garde is perceived by many on the Austrian Right as being ‘anti-patriotic’ 
due to their radicalism and willingness to question the ideological foundations of the Second 
Republic.  Hence, a commonly used term for such artists and cultural figures is to call them 
Nestbeschmutzers. This critique of artists comes from various conservative forces in 
Austrian political culture; as a result, it is not unusual for artists and cultural figures to be 
‘targeted’ in political rhetoric. 
This peculiarly Austrian treatment of Kultur in the political arena is highlighted by a 
comparison with the United Kingdom. Within British political discourse it would be very 
                                                            
20 ‘Nestbeschmutzer’ = a German/Austrian expression meaning to ‘foul your own nest’ – i.e. a common insult for avant-garde artists 
intent on producing ugly, obscene, or disgusting art which is perceived as  – in effect – anti-patriotic…..  
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unusual for a political party to take a ‘stance’ on Modern Art and its proponents. There have 
been ripples of derision in the tabloids about the artistic merit of certain exhibitions, e.g. 
Carl Andre’s ‘Pile of Bricks’ in 1976 (Daily Mirror, 16/2/1976). However art and culture is 
basically an off-limits topic for British political parties – mostly due to the fact that there is 
very little political capital to be gained from the politicization of culture. In fact, there is 
evidence of the British political class trying to ingratiate itself with the avant-garde in order 
to display a certain type of ‘coolness’. The Tate Modern in London has become a kind of 
cathedral – devoted to displaying modern art and attracting huge visitor numbers. Critics of 
modern art in the UK confine themselves to conservative cultural circles with art critics such 
as Brian Sewell. No political party would achieve anything by campaigning ‘against’ modern 
art, it is therefore left alone. All these examples point to a political establishment willing to 
embrace modern art as just another aspect of cultural output. Austria, by contrast, has from 
the 19th century right up to the present day never experienced a comfortable relationship 
between the political élite and modern art – leading to outright hostility to such cultural 
output by many ordinary Austrians.  
A logical consequence of this state of affairs is that Kultur was, and still is, an important 
political football in Austria – leading to a state propagation of more traditional, parochial art 
while at the same time marginalizing the avant-garde. Thus, when Haider took over the FPÖ 
in 1986 – an essential element in the popularization of his political message was for the 
party to take an overt stance on Kultur and include it as an integral part of their overall 
political strategy in the 1990s. 
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There follows a selection of some key Austrian artists, authors and cultural commentators 
whom Haider perceived as belonging to the ‘left-wing cultural mafia’. The artists and 
cultural figures chosen stem from the cosmopolitan and avant-garde cultural sector as 
practicing artists, authors or journalists. They perceive Haider’s FPÖ as an extreme right-
wing revival of a latent Nazi undercurrent in Austrian society – laid dormant by the post-war 
Austrian ‘consensus’ politics. In the 1990s, just as in 1900s, Austrian artists entered a 
political arena left vacant by the inability of the mainstream left to effectively challenge the 
rise of the populist Right (see chapter 1). Please note that some of the figures mentioned 
have also appeared when discussing the FPÖs’ cultural targets – here I will analyse the 
response of the avant-garde in Austria to Haider. 
Herman Nitsch 
Herman Nitsch is a good example of one of the FPÖ’s prime cultural targets in the 
Linkerkulturmafia. Although Nitsch actually sees himself as avowedly un-political – he felt 
‘compelled’ to ‘take a stand’ against Haider’s FPÖ:  
“….from the outset, I want to state that I am not political….my art was never political…but 
this is an emergency situation. and haider is someone who is fishing for votes by targeting 
and defaming artists” (Nitsch in Scharsach, 2000, p243) 
Nitsch claims that the historical combination of ‘Austro-fascism, Nazism and post-war 
fascism’ (Ibid, p244) almost completely destroyed modern art in Austria. This resulted in 
most Austrians after 1945 perceiving such art as something ‘perverse and disgusting – for 
which all decent Austrians should be ashamed’ (Ibid, p243). The avant-garde of the fin-de-
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siècle were already ‘buried’ and the Catholic Church revitalized. Nitsch recalls that most of 
his problems – especially those he encountered in the 1960s – resulted from being attacked 
by the ÖVP, for which he ended up spending time in prison and eventual exile in Germany. 
He was charged with ‘public obscenity’ (Fellner, 1997). 
Nitsch notes that Haider is a politician ‘without ideology’ who ‘profited from the dullness of 
the two main political parties’. He states that from the outset, the FPÖ saw him as an 
‘enemy’ and a ‘philistine’ (Ibid, p245). Nitsch recalls how the FPÖ took up the historical 
mantle of the ÖVP by directly attacking and trying to prevent Nitsch’s ‘blasphemous’ art 
being displayed and performed. Ironically, while Haider’s FPÖ increased pressure on Nitsch 
in the 1990s, his reputation outside of Austria rose to the point of him being hailed as one of 
Austria’s ‘greatest living artists’ (Ibid, p247).  
On a final note, Nitsch states that the FPÖ despise art that tries to tell the truth or is 
remotely controversial – favoring ‘kitsch’ art instead. As a result, Haider plays the dangerous 
game of using the values of normal people who, not in possession of the necessary artistic 
insights, are then easy to manipulate for political purposes. In his pursuit of votes, Haider 
welcomes the entry of Kultur into the political arena as a way of popularizing the FPÖ even 
more. As far as Nitsch is concerned, Haider and the FPÖ simply do not care about art: 
“Basically, they (the FPÖ) don’t care about art; however it serves a useful purpose for them 
by spreading falsehoods and misunderstandings whereby some serious artists are being 
deeply offended”. (Ibid, p249) 
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Robert Fleck  
After the ÖVP agreed to enter into a coalition with Haider’s FPÖ in February 2000, the 
European Union (EU) decided to ‘boycott’ Austria (EU Report on Austria, 2000). The boycott 
mostly consisted of cosmetic actions and diplomatic snubs. Nevertheless, the EU’s action 
was unprecedented action to take against a member state revealing that the anxiety about 
Haider was more pronounced abroad than in Austria itself. Taking his cue from the EU, 
Robert Fleck (a prominent Austrian cultural critic) decided in February 2000 to greet the 
forming of the ÖVP/FPÖ coalition government by initiating an ‘artist’s boycott’ of Austria. 
There follows an excerpt from the text – which he wrote in English and circulated on the 
Internet (please note – his English mistakes have been left uncorrected): 
“Dear Friends, 
As you know, Austria got today the first federal government since the end of World War 
Second with a big participation of Nazis. I am born in this country, have lived there for 24 
years, now writing for almost twenty years in austrian newspapers, studied political history 
in this country. Also through my familly, I know in detail the inside stories of the FPOe - a 
party founded in 1948, after the amnesty for the big nazi rulers, to be a legal cover for their 
activity. 
In 1986, Joerg Haider took over the party by a putsch with the aim to re-establish these 
origins, and to rehabilitate the nazi period in Austria, and if possible in Central Europe……For 
the contemporary arts in Austria, I see only one possible choice: 
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NO LONGER EXHIBIT OR COOPERATE WITH AUSTRIA!! 
It has now become absolutely impossible, in moral terms, for any artist, gallerist, museum 
curator or collector, to exhibit any longer in Austria, or to cooperate with any Austrian 
institution. There is only one question to ask: would you have exhibited in Nazi-Germany? 
Only with a complete boycott of the local artlife, we can help the Austrian artists to survive. 
The new government wants to show that "everything is as before", regarding individual 
liberty. Since 1995, all international known Austrian artists are under pressure by the party 
of Joerg Haider; anonymous phone calls, Nazi-signs on their cars, menaces to take their 
children - since five years, many internationally known artists in Vienna are only moving with 
their familly in the city inside of closed cars. As far as I know, most of the jewish community 
is also behaving like this, because they were constantly aggressed in the street. During the 
"100 Years" exhibition in 1998, the Vienna Secession had constantly nazi-signs, painted 
during the night, on the building; the Austrian federal police refused to consider these facts, 
saying that "this is normal". The next years will be very hard for Austrian artists. They all 
talked to me in the last years or months about leaving the country. 
Even half of the actual students at the Vienna Academy were thinking about leaving the 
country. For a writer, an intellectual, this is relatively easy. For an artist, to change the 
country is very complicated. The only way to help them, is to boycott the country itself. If you 
show to the Austrian population that the new government is outlaw, then - but ONLY then - 
the voters may consider during the next elections in 2003 that this may have been a bad 
choice for their country……” (Robert Fleck – open letter published online, 02.02.2000) 
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With this appeal, Fleck sets out how the avant-garde in Austria felt attacked and threatened 
by the FPÖ. It is also an attempt by Fleck to galvanize Austrian artists into taking a political 
stance against Haider. His particular focus was on the new coalitions’ plans for radical cuts in 
the funding of the arts – which would hit the contemporary arts the hardest. 
Fleck’s initiative echoed the historical tendency for artists in Austria to take up the mantle of 
political critique due to a failure of the mainstream Left to mobilize against the populist 
Right, for example, statistics show that many working class Austrians actually supported 
Haider (Wodak & Pelinka -eds-, 2002). Fleck’s proposed boycott turned out to be a flop in 
terms of Austrian artists actually withdrawing from exhibitions or participating in the 
boycott. In fact, the biggest headlines came when the American rock star, Lou Reed 
cancelled his Vienna rock concert due to Haider’s FPÖ in March 2000 (MTV Website, 
15/02/2000). 
IG Kultur 
IG Kultur is a left-wing cultural think tank based in Vienna (see website). They were active in 
producing and disseminating various papers and texts critical of Haider’s FPÖ – particularly 
in regards to his attacks against modern art. One of the areas that IG Kultur focused on was 
the apparent ‘marriage’ between the Catholic Church and the FPÖ (IG Kultur, 1995). They 
pointed out that quite powerful conservative segments of Austrian society (representing the 
political Right and the Catholic Church) were happy to see Haider blaze a trail of far-right 
populism in Austria whereby the resurgence of the Austrian avant-garde since the 1970s 
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could be not only stopped, but potentially replaced by a re-introduction of ‘moral values’ 
into the public sphere.  
The following caption epitomizes the fear held by many on the Austrian Left of an alliance 
emerging between the Catholic Church and the FPÖ. Note that the original dritte Kraft 
(‘third camp’ or the ‘other’ political camp as opposed to the SPÖ and ÖVP) was initially an 
anti-clerical political movement (see chapter 3). Haider’s populism saw the political 
advantage of now siding with the Catholic Church – particularly on issues such as morality 
and culture. 
This satirical poster shows a ‘kiss’ (published by IG Kultur) between Haider and Kurt Krenn – 
the then Catholic Bishop of Vienna – based in part on the famous ‘kiss’ photograph between 
Honecker and Brezhnev in the 1970s. 
 
Source: (IG Kultur, cover page, 2000) 
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However, as well as symbolizing the new ‘marriage’ between the FPÖ and the Austrian 
Catholic Church – this striking picture also plays on the ‘open secret’ – certainly amongst 
everyone I met during my research trip to Vienna – that Haider was gay. The question arises 
as to why the Austrian media or Haider’s opponents do not push this issue more to the 
fore? The media seems to have reached some kind of tacit agreement not to publish any 
discussion or speculation about Haider’s sexuality. As for Haider’s opponents – especially 
those located in the avant-garde, there seems to have been a fear of raising this subject due 
to Haider being a litigious politician, with plenty of resources available to fund legal actions. 
The result was that this subject was ignored in mainstream political discourse in Austria and 
left to groups such as IG Kultur or comedians to make indirect insinuations. 
Foe the avant-garde, this caption exposes the hypocrisy at the heart of Austria’s post-war 
society. A charismatic, paradoxical politician from the previously anti-clerical FPÖ intimately 
intertwines with the ultra-conservative bishop of Vienna. In addition, the anti-homosexual 
Catholic Church joins with (the allegedly gay) Haider in a political pact in order to reinforce 
traditional ‘Austrian’ values in a decadent society.  
Elfriede Jelinek 
Elfriede Jelinek is an author and playwright who became a high-profile target of FPÖ attacks 
on Austria’s ‘left-wing culture’. In many ways she sums up everything the FPÖ despised 
about the Austrian avant-garde – i.e. her left-wing politics, her Jewish ethnicity and her 
feminist identity. She has grown in international status in recent years, cumulating in her 
being awarded the Nobel Prize for Literature in 2004. The content of her work is critical and 
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follows in the footsteps of radical Austrian authors such as Karl Kraus and Thomas Bernhard. 
Like these writers, she attempts to expose the hypocrisy of Austrian society with a relentless 
focus on the catastrophic effects of the Holocaust and how this whole episode has been 
forgotten in consumerist post-war Austria (Konzett, 2000, p96).  Jelinek’s Jewish identity 
and critical subject matters qualified her for being singled out by Haider as being intent on 
‘destroying’ the patriotic and moral values that Haider was promoting in the FPÖ political 
strategy. 
Jelinek’s response to Haider was a sustained critique of the FPÖ’s cultural policies as well as 
portraying Haider’s FPÖ as representing an almost ‘homoerotic’ (and certainly misogynist) 
political phenomenon. In a direct response to the election result of October 1999 Jelinek 
formulated her views on Haider’s FPÖ (Scharsach, 2000). Her analysis represents another 
useful overview on how Haider was perceived by the Austrian cultural sector at this time. 
Firstly, Jelinek claims that Haider’s Kulturkampf is part of an overall project by the Austrian 
Right to stop or massively reduce state subsidies for art and culture – particularly those 
funds that support avant-garde art. She states that this basically means that the FPÖ wishes 
to make art and culture part of a ‘free market’ – “only those who survive market forces will 
be left over“(Jelinek in Scharsach, p239, 2000). 
The ‘leftovers’ Jelinek refers to here include categories such as ‘Representative Art’ or 
‘People’s Art’ – both of which have much easier access to private sponsorship for their 
financing than the contemporary arts. Jelinek points out that this type of cultural policy has 
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already been implemented in Haider’s political base, Carinthia from the early 1990s 
onwards (Ibid, p239). 
Secondly, Jelinek notes that Austria is, historically, an authoritarian state where the art 
sector stands out as the one and only critical institution in Austrian society. She sees 
Haider’s focus on this sector as a kind of political ‘coup’ – in the sense that it will disable the 
last existing bastion of dissidence to the Austrian political establishment (Ibid, p.240). Haider 
can always count on support for his ‘cultural crusade’ from the tabloid media and the 
Catholic Church. Jelinek extends this critique by arguing that her Jewish identity and 
Austrian anti-Semitism also play a role in the FPÖ attacks against her. This argument is in a 
similar vein to Wodak’s discourse analysis (Wodak et al, 1999) of the FPÖ’s apparent use of 
‘codes’ to appeal to the ‘ordinary people’ in Austria. Jelinek states: 
“The whole thing is a code for something they (FPÖ) do not want and in fighting it they can 
rely on widespread public support – without actually explicitly stating their aim”. (Ibid, 
p241). 
Finally, Jelinek criticizes Haider from a feminist perspective – accusing the FPÖ of 
popularizing its message with apparent ‘homoerotic codes’, which have the effect of 
‘fixating’ particularly young Austrian males21. She states that in order to optimize and 
increase his popularity from the young male vote, Haider puts a significant emphasis on 
political aesthetics: 
                                                            
21 there is evidence that Haider’s largest measure of electoral support did in fact come from young males aged 18 to 24 (Mair et al, 2004) 
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“Haider should never be seen as just a politician, but as a homoerotic phenomenon 
…through his clothes (leather!), sport photos, cosmetic surgery and half naked at the 
Woerthersee Lake”. (Ibid p240) 
Christoph Schlingensief 
The German avant-garde artist, Christoph Schlingensief, typified the pervading international 
concern with the ‘right turn’ taken in Austrian politics in February 2000. He set up an art 
‘installation’ in the centre of Vienna in June 2000. Schlingensief’s artwork was called ‘Bitte 
Liebt Österreich – Erste Europäische Koalitionswoche’ (Please Love Austria – The First 
European Coalitions Week) (Liliethal et al, 2000). It caused a brief uproar in the Austrian 
media during the duration of its performance. The intention of the artist was to highlight 
the plight of immigrants and foreigners in Austria resulting from the newly formed coalition 
of Haider’s FPÖ with the ÖVP.  The installation involved Schlingensief organizing a public 
happening where 12 (real) refugees awaiting asylum in Austria were put up for a week in 
containers and filmed 24 hours a day. It was an attempt to expose the anti-foreigner 
sentiment and legislation of the new government. It certainly had an impact; Jelinek praised 
how Schlingensief ‘exposed the state of Austria to the rulers like throwing a pie in their 
faces’ (Ibid, 2000, p273). 
Schlingensief’s installation can be understood as an attempt to show solidarity with the 
actions of Austrian artists under attack from the FPÖ. His aim was to send a ‘wake-up’ call to 
the Austrian public concerning the right-wing populist thrust into xenophobia and 
intolerance resulting from the coalition with Haider and the consequences of this for 
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minorities such as asylum-seekers. It actually had very little effect. In fact, the Austrian 
tabloid press and the FPÖ seized upon the opportunity to ‘expose’ that the ‘insane’ action 
by Schlingensief was being subsidized by the Viennese local authorities. For the FPÖ, this 
installation was a typical example of the Linkerkulturmafia wasting honest taxpayers’ money 
(Ibid, p 12).  The popular tabloid ‘Kronen Zeitung’ headline on the opening day of 
Schlingensief’s art installation read: 
“Container-Show costs millions! 245,000 Schilling weekly fee paid to Schligensief!” (Kronen 
Zeitung, 12/6/2000)  
While there is certainly an argument that the artistic and political intentions of Schlingensief 
were probably sincere and well-intentioned in his desire to ‘expose’ the xenophobic policies 
of the new coalition. The actual result in the Austrian public sphere was a further hardening 
of attitudes to such ‘wasteful’, ‘provocative’ and ‘elitist’ art. To make matters worse, 
Schlingensief was also portrayed as another ‘interfering foreigner’ (in this case a German!) 
who was arrogantly lecturing the Austrians on how to run ‘their’ country. His installation 
was therefore only supported by a small circle of people within the Austrian avant-garde or 
on the Left. Schlingensief’s installation ended up having much more of an impact outside of 
Austria as an example of agitprop art than influencing a more tolerant policy towards 
refugees in Austria itself. 
Heinz Sichrovsky 
A final example used for this case study about the artistic response to Haider concerns Heinz 
Sichrovsky, the cultural editor of the Austrian weekly periodical ‘NEWS’. His response to 
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Haider’s FPÖ gaining executive power in 2000 was set out in an article with the title 
‘Heimathaftung – Der Kulturkampf in Österreich’ (Caught in the Homeland – The Austrian 
Culture Wars) (Sichrovsky in Scharsach, p227, 2000). The article gives an historic and 
contemporary context to the rise of Haider and begins by clearly stating that any attempt at 
the pursuit of right-wing populist politics in Austria always and must include taking a 
position on the issues of Kunst und Kultur with the inevitable consequence of attacks on 
Modern Art: 
“Haider was helped by riding a kind of surfboard...the same one as all (Austrian) populist 
movements had rode on in the past. Thus it became inevitable that the FPÖ turned to artistic 
and cultural sectors in order to include them in their political strategy” (Ibid, p227) 
For Sichrovsky, 20th century Austrian history contains a continuous thread of legislation and 
politicization from the Right against Modern Art (see also chapter 1 of this study). The 
scandal surrounding the staging of Thomas Bernhard’s play ‘Heldenplatz’ in 1988 was 
fuelled by the ÖVP – at that time the FPÖ were still a marginal political force or as 
Sichrovsky puts it ‘a second address for culture wars in Austria’ (Ibid, p228). He then 
pinpoints the start of Haider’s Kulturkampf to the election campaign poster from 1995 (see 
above) – which he perceives as a kind of ‘declaration of war’ on culture by the FPÖ (Ibid, 
p229).  
On a more pessimistic and/or realistic note, Sichrovsky ends his article (Ibid, p.236) 
describing how Austrian artists and cultural figures were very prominent in the initial 
demonstrations against the ÖVP/FPÖ coalition government during February 2000 (Ibid, 
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p234). However, within a few weeks this ‘politicization’ of artists dissolved amidst divisions, 
recriminations and apathy – with a few notable exceptions, in particular Elfriede Jelinek 
(Ibid, p.234). Sichrovsky claims that there is a fundamental problem involved in the 
expectation that artists will be at the forefront of a political opposition to Haider because 
they are easily exposed by the tabloids as ‘scroungers, elitists’ etc. In addition, the humdrum 
and minutiae of effective political activism is almost impossible for artists to sustain. 
Sichrovsky underlines a key issue here relating to the rise of Haider, namely how politically 
ineffective the Austrian mainstream Left (SPÖ) has become in challenging the Far Right and 
their inability to capture the imagination of voters with their political program. 
Summary 
Several important points emerge from these responses of artists to Haider. Firstly, political 
dissent seems to be mostly located in the cultural sector in Austria. This leads to a weaker 
response from traditional progressive forces such as trade unions or left-wing political 
parties to the threat of right-wing populism. In a sense there is an expectation from actors in 
Austrian politics that artists will take up the mantle of opposition to right-wing populism 
rather than anyone else. However, as I have made clear in this case study, artists might be 
effective in producing powerful images and words, but they are not in a position to sustain 
or lead an effective political opposition. 
Secondly, and leading on from the previous point, almost all attempts by the artistic 
community to rebuff the FPÖ and highlight the reactionary nature of Haider’s populism had 
very little resonance amongst the general population. In fact, the more controversial actions 
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– such as Schlingensief’s installation – actually backfired and reinforced Haider’s view that 
the cultural avant-garde was ‘out of touch’ and that the state was ‘wasting taxpayer’s 
money’ on them etc.  
Thirdly, Haider’s FPÖ used their campaign against contemporary artists as part of an overall 
political campaign with the intention of ‘moving’ people (Charim, 2001). In this, the FPÖ 
were indeed very successful. On the other hand, Austrian artists tended to get a resonance 
to their anti-Haider campaign only with a narrow, culturally informed audience or with 
various interested audiences abroad. 
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Part 4: The ‘Austrian Idea’ 
The concluding part of this case study will underline my argument about the centrality of 
kultur in Austrian politics by giving the chronology of the ‘Austrian Idea’, based on an article 
and interview with Michael Wimmer, an Austrian cultural historian in 2002 (Transcripts, 
2002). This ideological concept, created in the 1950s, is a very important background factor 
to understanding Haider’s kultupolitik in the 1990s. 
As I have already outlined in this study, a crucial part of the post-war re-construction of a 
new type of ‘Austrian’ identity that would influence the future character of Haider’s FPÖ can 
be traced by focusing on the cultural policies of the Second Republic. In line with the 
distinctly conservative character of the new government, it’s cultural policy centered on the 
promotion of a so-called ‘Austrian Idea’ – a cultural-ideological notion already promoted 
during Austro-Fascism in the 1930s (see chapter 1). In the 1950s, the Austrian author 
Gerhard Fritsch proposed an ‘Austrian Cultural Renaissance’ (Wimmer, 1996, p42). The aim 
of this ‘cultural renaissance’ was to tune in with the political and social discourse of ‘moving 
on’ from National Socialism and attempt to ignite a new type of patriotism to post-war 
Austria. The cultural ‘sources’ chosen for this ‘renaissance’ were drawn from the Austro-
Hungarian imperial era, where the basis of artistic output was a traditional, catholic 
doctrine, rather than the more controversial art of the Fin-de-Siècle or the work of 
‘degenerate’ exiled Austrian artists. This led to the cultural policies of 1930s being re-kindled 
in a post-war Austrian setting with the aim of shoring up a parochial, conservative view of a 
new Austrian nation: 
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“Its cultural policy principles (i.e. Austro-Fascism) were re-interpreted to have been the great 
alternatives to National Socialism. Thus began the search for a greater Austria, as it was 
expected to be found in the times of the Imperial monarchy, on the basis of rigid 
Catholicalism.....it was therefore not surprising that there was no room left for the exiled 
victims of National Socialism in their former homeland”. (Ibid, p42) 
This form of cultural policy was pursued in Austria right up to the 1970s, the main casualty 
of this emphasis on classical and conservative art being modern, experimental art. Austria 
had reclaimed its Habsburg past and in the process proclaimed itself as the land of 
grandiose baroque architecture, Biedermeier artistic style or the ‘Wiener Klassik’ of Mozart 
or Strauss (Bruckmüller, 1994). Ironically, despite attempts by the state to ‘eradicate’ 
German influences in the political sphere (Thaler, 2001), it was mostly Germanic high-
culture that was being proclaimed as the epitome of the new 'Austrian Idea': 
“Many of the artists who were successful during the Austro-fascist period were now among 
friends, provided each other with functions and set about cultural revival. This self-appointed 
elite saw itself as having a monopoly on cultural values, and was closely connected with the 
‘Austrian idea’ of the one and only ‘true Austria’. The ideology of subordination, or the 
resolution of all social and historical contradictions, was to find its valid counterpart in the 
Austrian idea”. (Wimmer, 1996, p43) 
During the 1950s and 1960s, nobody in the Austrian cultural sphere epitomized this ‘surge’ 
in classical Viennese culture more than the internationally famous conductor of the Vienna 
Philharmonic Orchestra, Herbert von Karajan. He managed to sweep aside his clear links 
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with the previous Nazi regime and became a kind of musical superstar (Hanisch, 1994, 
p435). He pertinently avoided doing any contemporary, avant-garde works and symbolized 
the self-confidence of the re-vamped ‘Austrian Idea’ that proved to be a crucial 
underpinning to the political goal of shaping a distinctly ‘Austrian’ national identity out of 
the ruins of war: 
“His scandals were in the tabloids, he acted like royalty, his passion for new technologies, his 
media presence, his purposeful elegance and his business ability – all of this made Herbert 
von Karajan an icon of that era” (Ibid, p436)   
Austrian popular culture (as opposed to ‘high’ culture) was also influenced by post-war 
identity politics. There was a surge in popularity for sentimental Heimat films, portraying an 
imaginary world of ‘quiet order and a society that displayed a fully intact conservative 
hierarchy’ (Hanisch, 1994, p434). The traditional and so-called naturwüchsig gender roles of 
men and women were played out against the background of an undisturbed, beautiful 
Austrian landscape – representing a world seemingly untouched by the calamitous events of 
war and genocide (Ibid, p435). 
This avoidance of dealing with the legacy of Nazism in Austria was in sharp contrast to post-
war Germany. Here, a more reflective and confrontational approach was taken by leading 
German writers who were able to work with far less state interference than their fellow 
artists in Austria. Heinrich Böll, Günter Grass and others took up National Socialism as their 
direct subject matter. By contrast, Austrian authors looked instead to 1918 or 1934 as 
fateful dates in Austria's recent past - not that of 1938 (Ibid, p.439). Artistic production in 
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Austria was encouraged by the state to cater for a public that eagerly consumed themes 
centered on nostalgia for Austria's 19th century past, i.e. ‘the good old days’. 
The Austrian Heimat film was then very successfully ‘exported’ to international audiences in 
the form of the Hollywood film, The Sound of Music. Here, Austria was depicted as a country 
of beautiful countryside, brimming with musical culture that then tragically became the 
‘victim’ of German Nazi aggression. There was a definite sense in the film that Austrians 
were the ‘good’ Germans - an image energetically encouraged by Austrian political elites: 
“Instead of portraying the von Trapp family in an Austria grounded in political reality, Robert 
Wise (the director) constructs an Austrian identity based on love of nature, country and 
family.....an American Heimatfilm set in Austria”. (Wodak & Good (eds), 1999, p183) 
This state-driven restoration of traditional cultural values also involved an embattled and 
marginalized Austrian contemporary art scene. Many of the more innovative artists had 
already left Austria during the war and were not welcomed back. Artistic taste centered on a 
conservative paradigm - to the exclusion of any experimental or overtly political works of 
art. Even pieces by Bertold Brecht were banned due to their apparent ‘communist’ content. 
The first murmurings of discontent with this parochialism came in the form of the Wiener 
Gruppe during the 1950s, a group of artists and writers who performed Dadaistic and 
satirical performances that often ridiculed the Austrian cultural establishment (Denscher, 
1999). The 1960s brought an escalation of artistic dissent against the prevailing conservative 
cultural hegemony. This occurred amidst an international dynamic of student revolts, the 
Vietnam War and international liberation movements. However, unlike the experience of 
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other countries, the 1960s revolt in Austria took place mostly in the cultural arena rather 
than in the form of street demonstrations, strikes or civil unrest (see chapter 1). The content 
of this type of artistic dissent focused upon themes such as sexual taboos; the legacy of 
National Socialism; or the repressive and stifling nature of Catholic conservative Austrian 
society. In literature, Thomas Bernhard, Peter Handke and Elfriede Jelinek criticized the so-
called post-war ‘normalization’ of Austrian society, attacking: 
“the lingering rhetoric of national consensus that helped shape the fascist paradigms of 
Austro-German culture and politics” (Konzett, 2000, p.xi). 
And from Bernhard’s famous work of 1988:  
“When everything stinks of decay and everything screams out for destruction / the voice of a 
single person has become useless / it’s not as if nothing is said or written against this 
disastrous process / every day things are being said and written against it / but whatever is 
said and written against it is not being heard or read / the Austrians do not hear any more 
and do not read anymore / that’s to say they hear something about catastrophic conditions 
but do nothing about them / and they read about catastrophic conditions but do nothing 
against them / the Austrians are a people full of indifference toward their catastrophic 
condition” (Bernhard, 1995) 
However it was in the ‘performance art’ movement that the most public and controversial 
cultural dissent took place in Austria during the 1960s, embodied by a group of artists 
known as the ‘Viennese Actionists’ (see case-study). This group of young artists challenged 
the dominant cultural hegemony, accusing it of simply ‘fostering tradition’ (Klocker et al, 
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2008). The Aktionisten put on performances where the sacred symbols of Austrian ‘culture’ 
were ‘desecrated’ or the religiously imposed sexual taboos of Austrian society were used as 
a theme for provocative, ritualistic type performances. The audacious and provocative 
aspect of this artistic movement has been connected to the ‘pent-up’ and repressed state of 
modern art in post-war Austria (Hanisch, 1994). 
In the 70s and 80s there was a loosening of the strict conservative grip on Austrian culture, 
overseen by the SPÖ Chancellor who dominated Austrian politics between 1970 and 1983, 
Bruno Kreisky. He attempted to formulate a new, more progressive cultural policy program 
under the slogan:  ‘A Concept of Wider Culture’ (Wimmer, 1996, p45). This was to be in tune 
with the desire for a more open, liberal and modern Austria - supposedly represented by 
Kreisky (Pelinka et al, 2008). The Kreisky era promised, mostly in a rhetorical fashion, the 
reconciliation between modernist, intellectual elements of culture on the one side and the 
Austrian political establishment on the other (Hanisch, 1994, p475). There was also an 
attempt made to free art and culture from the dominating control of the state and its 
various institutions (Wimmer, 1996, p47). 
In this atmosphere of promoting more ‘freedom in the arts’, the vulnerable position of 
contemporary art in Austria actually managed strengthen a little. More subsidies became 
available for experimental artistic projects and progressive artists began to produce work in 
a more benign and responsive political atmosphere. However, it was also clear throughout 
the period that while the political establishment had begun to be more flexible in its 
attitudes to contemporary artists, the general population remained unmoved or even 
antagonistic towards modern art (Menasse, 2005). This popular antagonism towards 
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progressive artistic culture was reflected by repeated headlines in the tabloid press and was 
subsequently exploited and manipulated for political purposes by Haider in the 1990s. 
The 1990s ushered in a much more conflict ridden period in Austrian politics and culture. 
Against the background of an increasingly difficult financial situation, the Far-Right under 
Haider joined forces with the catholic-conservative Right to condemn the subsidizing of 
modern, experimental or socially critical art just as was the case in the early years of the 
Second Republic (see my case study). The scene was set for another cultural clash that 
entailed a political confrontation with certain Austrian contemporary artists and what they 
represented in terms of internationalism, multiculturalism and progressive values. This 
confrontation with the contemporary art scene became an integral part of Haider’s political 
strategy in the 1990s and by pursuing this strategy, Haider attempted to promote, in similar 
fashion to previous decades, a new type of ‘Austrian Idea’ that tapped into the popular 
sentiment of antipathy towards modern art that had been institutionalized by Austrian 
governments since 1945. 
Summary  
This case study exposes the deep historical fracture in Austrian society that has created an 
‘us and them’ chasm in art and culture, leading to an artistic community feeling under siege 
and the populist Right using them as a pawn for populist electoral gains. An almost 
structural parochialism in Austrian society is exposed whereby an acceptance of modern art 
prevalent in countries such as Germany and Britain is seemingly absent in Austria. It is also 
clear from the ideological push for an ‘Austrian Idea’ that culture plays a prominent role in 
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Austrian politics and was an important element in the construction of a post-war identity. 
Unlike most of Europe, art and culture form a political and ideological battleground which I 
would argue to be an essential area to investigate in order to gain an insight into a political 
phenomenon like Jörg Haider. My case study also underlines the peculiarly Austrian 
character of Haider’s FPÖ by focusing on their attitude and policies towards Kultur and the 
avant-garde in Austria. 
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Conclusion 
 
This thesis has tried to give the reader a context and explanation for the causes of Haider’s 
rise in the 1990s. The case study was written in the hope of enriching the scholarship on 
Haider by focusing on the peculiarly Austrian phenomenon whereby Kultur, historically and 
in the present-day, has been politicized to a much further extent than most other European 
countries. By locating Haider’s FPÖ in a cultural study, you are able to get a much clear 
insight into the character and ideology of this political party and movement. 
There are a few final remarks I would like to mention which are relevant to the study and 
that would probably be useful to investigate more in further research. 
Firstly, this ‘culturalist’ approach to Haider shows that the populist Right’s emphasis on 
subjectivity pays off with real political capital. Many Austrian people were ‘moved’ by 
Haider, he seemed to capture the voter’s imagination by a combination of emotional appeal 
and very skillful political marketing. This type of identity politics has been exploited by the 
populist Right in Austria and elsewhere with tangible political results. By comparison, the 
European Left (as opposed to the Left in South America) has been marginalized and appears 
unable to attract the populist vote it benefitted from earlier in the 20th century.  
Secondly, this study indicates that Haider acts almost like a benchmark for the subsequent 
spread of right-wing populism in Europe up to the present-day. Many populist Right parties 
copied or imitated Haider’s approach to political marketing in countries such as The 
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Netherlands (Pim Fortuyn & Geert Wilders), Le Pen in France or the Italian Liga Nord under 
Umberto Bossi. 
Thirdly, this research underlies the importance of carrying out country-specific research of 
political phenomena such as Haider. Much of the academic literature I read made sweeping 
and sometimes factually incorrect generalizations about a Europe-wide spread of right-wing 
populism. There are many aspects of Haider’s FPÖ that are rooted in specific events and 
movements in Austrian history that are an essential part of understanding and explain 
Haider’s rise in the 1990s. One example of this is the centrality of Kultur to Austrian politics 
which is simply not applicable in other national settings – hence this dissertation. 
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Appendix 
Interviews/Research in Vienna, January 2002 
I interviewed and talked to various people during a research trip to Austria in January 2002. 
Among those I spoke to were Michael Wimmer, Ruth Wodak, Melanie Sully, Wolfgang 
Neugebauer, IG Kultur and some FPÖ politicians. I have referenced some of the ideas arising 
out of these talks directly in the text. However more importantly, the whole ‘cultural turn’ 
of this study came about as a result of this trip. By talking to various players connected to 
Haider I was struck by the role and impact of culture in Austrian society – once this was 
contextualized in Haider’s political strategy it became important to unearth more about the 
relationship between the Austrian avant-garde and Haider’s FPÖ in order to understand and 
explain the Haider phenomenon more fully. In addition to this, all the people I spoke to who 
were critical of Haider mentioned his alleged homosexuality something I refer to in the case-
study. 
 This primary research reinforced my view that Haider should be understood much more in 
the context of a specifically Austrian phenomenon rather than simply explaining him away 
as part of a European trend towards right-wing populism.  
 
 
